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ARTICLES
The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against
Corporations in Environmental and Safety Torts
W. Kip VIscusI*
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps more than any other aspect of the judicial system, punitive damages
have come to symbolize the problems of our nation's courts. Punitive damages
awards are often substantial-running into the millions, and in rare cases, the
billions of dollars. These awards are also highly variable. Often there is no
clear-cut basis to predict the likely size of the punitive damage award, even
knowing the compensatory damages amount. The high stakes and high variabil-
ity of punitive damage awards are of substantial concern to companies, as
punitive damages may pose a catastrophic threat of corporate insolvency.
Punitive damages' high stakes raise legitimate concerns for legal reformers, in
light of the general belief that juries lack sufficiently well-defined guidelines
and expertise to set punitive awards reliably.
In her dissenting opinion in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,
Justice O'Connor eloquently summarized the current deficiencies in the Court's
handling of punitive damage awards:
Punitive damages'are a powerful weapon. Imposed wisely and with re-
straint, they have the potential to advance legitimate state interests. Imposed
indiscriminately, however, they have a devastating potential for harm. Regret-
tably, common-law procedures for awarding punitive damages fall into the
latter category. States routinely authorize civil juries to impose punitive
damages without providing them any meaningful instructions on how to do
so. Rarely is a jury told anything more specific than 'do what you think
best.'...
In my view, such instructions are so fraught with uncertainty that they defy
rational implementation. Instead, they encourage inconsistent and unpredict-
able results by inviting juries to rely on private beliefs and personal predilec-
tions. Juries are able to target unpopular defendants, penalize unorthodox or
controversial views, and redistribute wealth. Multimillion dollar losses are
inflicted on a whim. While I do not question the general legitimacy of
punitive damages, I see a strong need to provide juries with standards to
constrain their discretion so that they may exercise their power wisely, not
* John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School. My research was
supported by the Harvard University Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business; the Sheldon
Seevak Research Fund; and a grant from the EXXON Corporation.
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capriciously or maliciously. The Constitution requires as much.I
The usual approach to evaluating legal rules such as those pertaining to
punitive damages is to assess their performance in well-defined hypothetical
scenarios. If there is a problem with how these legal rules might perform in
different accident contexts, then the solution is to tinker with the structure of the
rule so that it will continue to perform well in situations in which it is effective,
while at the same time eliminating the problems that arise in other contexts
where it performs less satisfactorily. This kind of thought process provided the
impetus for the tort liability reforms enacted in response to the 1984-1986
liability insurance crisis. 2 Yet, even though punitive damages reforms were
often at the forefront of liability reforms adopted by various states in the mid to
late 1980s, dissatisfaction with courts' assessment of punitive damages contin-
ues.
Accordingly, the approach taken in this article is a more fundamental one.
Rather than focusing solely on isolated examples of extreme punitive damages
excess, I suggest that we reassess whether punitive damages serve any construc-
tive role at all. In doing so, I adopt a methodology that differs from the usual
hypothetical case study approach that dominates the law and economics litera-
ture. The usual stylized liability problem formulations implicitly assume empiri-
cal relationships that may not in fact exist. In particular, they assume that
punitive damages serve a valuable deterrent function. Moreover, they assume
that juries will apply punitive damages to narrowly defined economics prob-
lems, whereas juries in practice may apply punitive damages more broadly.
Prior reform efforts have invariably resulted not in subtle tinkering with puni-
tive damages formulas according to economists' prescriptions, but rather in the
imposition of some kind of cap or limit on punitive damages. This article goes
beyond those reform efforts to ask whether punitive damages should be abol-
ished altogether for corporations in environmental and safety torts.
The methodological approach I use is based not on hypothetical economic
problems but rather on a societal benefit-cost approach of the type typically
used to assess other social policies, such as government regulations: On bal-
ance, do punitive damages generate more benefits to society than costs? Even
after a wave of tort liability reform measures, there is still widespread dissatisfac-
tion with the role of punitive damages in our legal system. It is instructive to ask
whether these adverse effects are so great that punitive damages do not pass a
benefit-cost test. Put somewhat differently, would society's welfare be improved
if we eliminated punitive damages as a legal instrument? This article will
1. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (granting
juries "unchanneled, standardless discretion" with regard to punitive damages violates constitutional
"safeguard" under the Due Process Clause).
2. For a detailed assessment of the performance of different aspects of the tort liability system along
these lines, see general~y AMERiCAN LAW INSTrrTUTE, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY:
REPORTERS' STUDY (1991) [hereinafter AMERCAN LAW INSTrrUTE].
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explore that question in the context of corporate actions affecting risk and
environmental safety.
My reform prescription that we abolish punitive damages in this context
would seem to contradict the plausibly constructive role that punitive damages
may play in selected instances. However, the kind of fine tuning of punitive
damages to narrowly defined circumstances that law and economics scholars
envision3 is required to ensure a constructive role for punitive damages does not
account for how juries actually behave. Moreover, none of the state reforms of
punitive damages have incorporated subtle economic criteria for awarding and
setting punitive damages. Rather, they have all focused on very simple ap-
proaches, such as damages caps.4
The overriding issue that must be addressed before abolishing punitive
damages is whether doing so will eliminate a constructive force for the promo-
tion of safety and the protection of the environment. Because no existing study
adequately addresses this issue, this article presents the most comprehensive
empirical assessment to date of the effects of punitive damages. This task is
facilitated by the fact that four states already have liability regimes in which
punitive damages are not awarded. Have these states performed worse on any
reasonable measure of safety, as one would expect, if punitive damages do in
fact have a deterrent effect?
Any assessment of the desirability of punitive damages requires a thorough
assessment of whether they serve any constructive deterrent function.5 Part I of
this article examines possible measures of the efficacy of punitive damages and
fails to find any systemic differences in the safety and environmental perfor-
mance between states with punitive damages and states without them. Thus,
there is no deterrence benefit that justifies the chaos and economic disruption
inflicted by punitive damages.
Part II defines the context of the corporate risk decisions that are the subject
of this study. How do corporations make risk decisions, and what factors,
including legal rules, influence them? Punitive damages can influence these risk
decisions by increasing the financial sanctions for adverse outcomes of risky
decisions. However, if experience shows that punitive damages awards are
unpredictable or unlikely, there will be less deterrence.
Part III reviews the conceptual rationales for punitive damage that have been
offered in the law and economics literature. These conceptual rationales all deal
with highly specialized circumstances, which often involve refined economic
3. For a comprehensive law and economics perspective, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell,
Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARv. L. REv. 869 (1998).
4. For a review of medical malpractice reforms, see W. Kip Viscusi & Patricia Born, Medical
Malpractice Insurance in the Wake of Liability Reform, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 463 (1995). For a general
review of limits on punitive damages, see RIcHARD L. BLATT Er AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A STATE-BY-
STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE (1991).
5. Unpredictability may lead to effects other than simply less deterrence for risk-related decisions.
Unpredictibility can also alter incentives for actions that do not reduce risk, leading to inefficient
incentive effects depending on the character of the penalties firms expect to be imposed.
1998]
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judgments likely to be beyond a jury's competence. Consequently, the absence
of a measurable deterrent effect of punitive damages is not surprising. More-
over, market forces and regulatory incentives are more powerful and more
appropriate means to provide the necessary deterrence incentives.
The absence of any positive record of accomplishment for punitive damages
does not, however, imply that they are benign or inconsequential. Part IV
examines some of the concrete economic harms that occur when indiscriminate
legal sanctions are levied without a sound economic basis.
If punitive damages are so problematic, why have they resisted meaningful
reform? Part V explores these issues, tracing the difficulties to various kinds of
incorrect approaches to risk decisions embodied in jury behavior and societal
reactions to risk more generally. Part VI concludes the paper with a proposal to
eliminate punitive damages for corporate risk and environmental decisions.
I. PUNITIVE DAMAGES HAVE No SIGNIFICANT DETERRENT EFFECT
The linchpin for any economic argument in support of punitive damages is
their role in deterring risky behavior. Section IIIB explores the stated economic
bases for punitive damages, all of which hinge on an assumed empirical
relationship between punitive damages and corporate risk decisions.
The rationale for such a linkage is straightforward. Punitive damages increase
the penalty on the firm after an accident or adverse environmental outcome.
When the firm calculates the costs of increased safety against the expected costs
associated with adverse risk outcomes, the potential for punitive damages will
boost expected costs of risky outcomes, making precautions more attractive.
While this deterrence relationship is not controversial, the linkages in practice
may not be so clearly consequential. Suppose that juries award punitive dam-
6
ages and set their amount in a completely random and capricious manner.
Under this extreme assumption, there will be no linkage between the expected
punitive damages costs and the firm's risk action.7 Consequently, the existence
of a deterrent effect depends on whether punitive damages awards follow the
prescriptions touted by legal scholars or the more random patterns asserted by
punitive damages critics. Exploring the deterrence linkages will help resolve
which of the opposing viewpoints about jury behavior is correct.
If all states had the same punitive damages regimes and if these did not vary
over time, it would be impossible to assess their influence. Fortunately, a natural
experiment already exists. Four states-Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire
and Washington-do not permit punitive damages. 8 Thus, these four states
already have in place the liability regime that I recommend. Is there any
6. For a critique of the predictability of punitive damages, see George L. Priest, Punitive Damages
Reform: The Case of Alabama, 56 LA. L. REV. 825 (1996).
7. If the pattern of desired awards is not predictable, firms could respond by eliminating all sources
of risk. Since products cannot be made risk-free, such responses often take the form of withdrawing
from markets altogether or not putting risky new products on the market.
8. See BLATr Er AL., supra note 4.
[Vol. 87:285
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evidence that these states fare worse with respect to risk than the states that do
permit punitive damages?
Punitive damages regimes of course differ in character. Criteria for punitive
damages awards may differ in terms of the statutory requirements or nature of
the conduct that must be present for punitive awards to be pertinent. 9 There also
may be punitive damages caps and limits on insurability. The analysis below
assesses the average effect of these punitive damages regimes as compared to
the no-punitive-damages states.
The nature of the statistical tests is twofold. First, this part analyzes the
average risk levels for states with and without punitive damages. Is there a
significant difference in performance that reflects evidence of a deterrent effect
of punitive awards? Such patterns may not, however, be fully informative, as
the states may differ in other ways, such as income levels and industry mix. The
second set of tests provided in the Appendix consists of multivariate regression
results that explicitly control for these differences. The implications of these
more refined statistical tests mirror the overall mean across state comparisons:
there is no evidence of a significant deterrent effect of punitive damages.
A. TOXIC CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS
Accidents involving toxic chemicals are local in character and should be
quite responsive to differences in states' financial incentives. Because these
accidents are relatively infrequent, Table 1 presents twomeasures of toxic
chemical accidents over the 1988-1992 period. The total number of chemical
accidents in the top panel was 34,000 over that period. As indicated in the
bottom panel of Table 1, the number of toxic chemical accidents involving
injury and death was just over 2000. In each case the accident rate per 100,000
population was lower for the four states without punitive damages than for the
rest of the country. The calculations in the table of accident rates per capita
account for differences in state size. Other adjustments, such as accident rates
based on a measure of industrial activity, also show no effect from punitive
damages. There is no statistically significant difference between the states with
and without punitive damages in terms of the risk level.
States with punitive damages are not, however, a homogeneous group. An
important difference pertains to whether corporations in those states can insure
against punitive damages. Some states permit insurance, other states explicitly
prohibit insurance, and a third group of states have not resolved whether to
allow insurance. If insurance premiums adjust to reflect the higher expected
costs when punitive damages are permitted, then any deterrent effect of punitive
damages should be similar irrespective of their insurability. One might hypoth-
esize, however, that if there is less than full responsiveness of insurance rates to
9. See id. at 118; id. at 112 (1993 pocket part) (noting that in New Hampshire there are limited
statutory circumstances under which punitive damages can be awarded).
1998] .289
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Table 1
Environmental Risk Differences in States with and without
Punitive Damages
TOXIC CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS, 1988-1992
States without punitive damages:
Michigan
Nebraska
New Hampshire
Washington
Four state totals
States with punitive damages:
Other 46 states and DC
States with insurable punitives
States with uninsurable punitives
States with uncertain insurance
rules regarding punitives
32,162
11,382
15,334
5,558
Population
9,418
1,604
1,114
5,147
17,283
237,727
68,213
141,930
28,698
Accidents/
Population
9.2
10.2
10.1
11.5
I0.1
19.4 2.26**
TOXIC CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS INVOLVING INJURY OR DEATH, 1988-1992
States without punitive damages:
Michigan
Nebraska
New Hampshire
Washington
Four state totals
9,418
1,604
1,114
5,147
17,283
States with punitive damages:
Other 46 states and DC
States with insurable punitives
States with uninsurable punitives
States with uncertain insurance
rules regarding punitives
2,016
559
1,199
237,727
68,213
141,930
272 28,698 0.95 1.89**
Note: The t-statistic tests the weighted mean accident rate for the four states which do not award punitive
damages against the weighted mean for the states in the category described.
For sources, see Table 6A, infra.
risk levels, the effect of punitive damages should be greater when insurance is
not permitted.
The results in Table 1 do not indicate any incentive role for the insurability
status. States with no punitive damages permitted have a toxic chemical acci-
dent rate of 10.1 per 100,000 population, which is below the rate of 10.8 for
states with uninsurable punitives, where these differences are not statistically
significant. States with insurable punitives and uncertain insurance have higher,
not lower, risk levels than the states without punitive damages, where these
differences are statistically significant for the states with uncertain insurability
of punitives. None of the effects in Table 1 indicate a deterrent role of punitive
damages in reducing toxic chemical accidents.
290
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B. TOXIC CHEMICAL RELEASE RISKS
A related set of risk measures consists of four environmental outcome
measures developed by the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) as part of its Toxic Release Inventory database. These environmental
risks are also local in character, so they should be subject to regional differences
in financial incentives-to the extent that punitive damages exert a deterrent
effect.
Analyzing the EPA toxic chemical release data is of interest for two reasons.
First, the government's statistics on handling toxic chemicals provide an instruc-
tive measure of the safety of companies' handling of dangerous chemicals. If
punitive damages have a deterrent effect, they should promote safer chemical
practices. Second, the Toxic Release Inventory database itself may give rise to
litigation, including lawsuits that lead to punitive damages. One prominent such
case was a fear-of-cancer case in California, Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co.' ° Using data derived from Toxic Release Inventory reports and other
government risk management data, plaintiffs who lived near a landfill sued
Firestone, which was responsible for some chemicals dumped at that site.' I The
California Supreme Court allowed such claims in a negligence action provided
that the plaintiffs met certain conditions, such as proving that the fear flowed
from their personal knowledge of the risk. 12 The four measures examined in
Table 2 are among the principal indices of toxic releases compiled by the EPA,
which monitors manufacturing facilities in the United States that handle sub-
stances designated by the EPA as toxic. The EPA requires facilities to file forms
that report on activities directed at reducing the amount of toxic releases from a
given source.
The first panel of toxic release statistics in Table 2 pertains to the number of
facilities that reduced their discharges. The fraction of facilities reducing their
discharges is 0.36 in the no-punitive-damages states and 0.36 for the country as
a whole. Reported source reductions, as measured by the number of facilities
reporting source reductions, do not vary with the presence of punitive damages.
The analysis of facilities reporting toxic release reductions indicates no signifi-
cant differences even when the insurability status of punitive damages is
recognized. The proportion of facilities reducing discharges is 0.36 for the
no-punitive-damages states and also 0.36 for the states with insurable punitives,
the states with uninsurable punitives, and the states with uncertain legal status
regarding punitive damages. These levels are virtually identical irrespective of
the punitive damages regime.
Facilities may, however, have multiple sources of toxic releases, leading to
10. 863"P2d 795 (Cal. 1993).
11. See "Cancerphobia" Cases Pose Threat to State's Businesses, Attorney Claims, 16 Chem. Reg.
Rep. (BNA) 1159 (Sept. 25, 1992).
12. See Eric S. Fisher, Potter v. Firestone and the Infliction of Emotional Distress, 30 TORT & INS.
L.J. 1071, 1072 (1995).
1998]
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the filing of multiple forms per facility. The second panel in Table 2 presents
analogous discharge reduction statistics using the number of forms as the unit of
analysis rather than the number of facilities. This measure consequently adjusts
for facility-related differences in the scale of potentially polluting activities. The
no-punitive-damages states once again do not exhibit a significant difference in
source reductions. The fraction of forms reflecting source reductions is 0.27 for
the no-punitive-damages states and 0.25 for the entire country. Whereas the
no-punitive-damages states had a fraction--O.27--of forms reporting dis-
charges, each of the three punitive-damages-insurance state groupings had a
lower (statistically insignificant) proportion of such reductions. The no-punitive-
Table 2
Reductions in Surface Water Discharges in States with and without
Punitive Damages (SWD)
FACILITIES REPORTING REDUCTIONS, IN TOXIC RELEASE INVENTORY (TRI)
Number of Proportion of
Facilities Facilities
# TRI Reducing Reducing
States without punitive damages:
Michigan
Nebraska
New Hampshire
Washington
Four state totals
States with punitive damages:
Other 46 states and DC
States with insurable punitives
States with uninsurable punitives
States with uncertain insurance rules
regarding punitives
FORMS REPORTING REDUCTIONS
States without punitive damages:
Michigan
Nebraska
New Hampshire
Washington
Four state totals
States with punitive damages:
Other 46 states and DC
States with insurable punitives
States with uninsurable punitives
States with uncertain insurance rules
regarding punitives
969
180
129
332
1,610
21,837
7,375
12,487
2,104 758 0.360 0.08
IN DISCHARGES
Number of
Forms
# TRI Reducing
Forms DJcbe
74,737
25,679
40,962
18,897
6,147
10,754
8,458 2,079
0.348
0.333
0.395
0.404
0.361
0.360 0.08
0.359 0.13
0.361 0.04
Proportion of
Forms
Reducing
Dkdlu=
0.266
0.248
0.229
0.308
0.270
0.253 0.63
0.239 1.28
0.263 0.23
0.246 0.91
HeinOnline  -- 87 Geo. L.J. 292 1998-1999
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Percent
reduction
in SWD,
1988192
Percent
reduction in
SWD, 1990- t-statistic,t-statistic,
1990-192
States without punitive damages:
Michigan
Nebraska
New Hampshire
Washington
States with punitive damages:
Four state totals
Other 46 states and DC
States with insurable punitives
States with uninsurable punitives
States with uncertain insurance rules
regarding punitives
2.15"*
4.36***
0.54
-159.0 -268.1 3.61***
REDUCTION IN TOTAL RELEASES Percent
reduction
in total
releases,
States without punitive damages:
Michigan 26.2
Nebraska 31.2
New Hampshire 54.6
Washington 40.3
four state totals 32.0
Percent
reduction in
total
releases, t-statistic,
1990-192 1988-192
19.0
25.0
29.0
36.8
24.4
3.12**
4.61***
2.66***
4.62***
t-statistic,
1990192
States with punitive damages:
Other 46 states and DC
States with insurable punitives
States with uninsurable punitives
States with uncertain insurance rules
regarding punitives
35.2 14.0
26.9 8.4
40.3 21.5
44.6 13.9 1.29
Note: The t-statistic tests the weighted mean for the four states which do not award punitive
damages against the weighted mean for the states in the category described.
Significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
Significant at the 99 percent confidence level.
For sources, see Table 6A, infra.
SOCIAL COSTS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Table 2 Continued
REDUCTION IN SURFACE WATER DISCHARGES
1.35*
1.87**
0.53
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damages states perform almost identically to the various punitive-damages-
insurance regimes with respect to forms reporting reductions in discharges.
The third panel in Table 2 focuses on the percent reduction in surface water
discharges, which are measured in terms of pounds of toxic pollutants released.
Statistics appear for two time periods, 1988-1992 and 1990-1992. The percent
reductions in the no-punitive-damages states are 66% in 1988-1992. Each of
these discharge reduction amounts is significantly below that of the other states,
and the magnitude of the discrepancy is substantial. This statistically significant
difference between punitive damages states and the no-punitive-damages states
is the better performance of no-punitive-damages states with respect to water
discharges of toxic chemicals. The comparison of the percent reduction in
surface water discharges in the no-punitive-damages states with the various
punitive-damages-insurance regimes indicates that the no-punitive-damages states
had the highest such reductions. This reduction value is significantly different
from that in all three punitive-damages-insurance status regimes. These statisti-
cally significant efforts provide no evidence of a deterrent role of punitive
damages. To the extent that the superior performance of the no-punitive-
damages states is due to other economic factors, the statistical analysis in the
Appendix controls for such influences.
The final panel in Table 2 considers the percent reduction in total toxic
releases. This category encompasses surface water discharges, underground
injection, releases to land, fugitive or nonpoint air emissions, and stack or point
air emissions. The no-punitive-damages states are not significantly different
from the punitive damages states from 1988-1992 and perform significantly
better than the punitive damages states from 1990-1992. The reduction in total
chemical releases is significantly lower in the no-punitive-damages states from
1988-1992 as compared to states with uncertain status for punitive damages
insurance. The larger chemical reductions in states with uninsurable punitives
from 1988-1992 seems to be due to the early years in that time period because
there is no statistically significant difference from 1990-1992. The Appendix
will analyze other causative factors as well.
C. ACCIDENTAL FATALITY RATES
Accidental fatality rates per person in different states also should reflect any
deterrent effect of punitive damages. If punitive damages lead firms to choose
safer risk levels, the accident rates should be higher in the four states that do not
permit punitive awards.
The first set of accidental deaths in Table 3 pertains to medical misadven-
tures, which consists of complications and misadventures of surgical and medi-
cal care. To the extent that medical malpractice punitive damages awards have a
deterrent effect, these rates should be higher in the states that do not have
punitive damages. The medical misadventure death rate is 0.89 per 100,000
[Vol. 87:285
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population in the no-punitive states, which is not significantly different from
states that recognize punitive damages. The overall United States death rate
average is a bit higher than in the no-punitive damages-states, or 1.00 death per
100,000. These differences are the opposite of what one would expect if
punitive damages deterred dangerous behavior. More refined analyses of medi-
cal misadventures by insurance status indicates that these rates are higher in
states in which punitive damages are insurable and lower in states in which the
insurability status of punitive damages is uncertain. As in the case of the toxic
release results, some differences such as this will occur on a random basis. What
is clear is that there is no consistent pattern of a deterrent effect of punitive
damages.
Table 3
Accidental Death Rates in States with and without Punitive Damages
MEDICAL MISADVENTURE DEATHS
States without punitive damages:
Michigan
Nebraska
New Hampshire
Washington
Four state totals
States with punitive damages:
Other 46 states and DC
States with insurable punitives
States with uninsurable punitives
States with uncertain insurance rules
regarding punitives
TOTAL DEATHS
States without punitive damages:
Michigan
Nebraska
New Hampshire
Washington
Four state totals
States with punitive damages:
Other 46 states and DC
States with insurable punitives
States with uninsurable punitives
States with uncertain insurance rules
regarding punitives
9,537
1,639
1,148
5,448
17,772
2,459 245,117
892 71,043
1,367 144,949
213 30,273
9,538
1,639
1,148
5,448
17,773
245,117
71,043
144,949
30,273
85,931
29,857
46,813
9,548
0.860
1.220
1.220
0.771
0.889
31.540 0.17
Note: The t-statistic tests the weighted mean death rate for the four states which do not award punitive
damages against the weighted mean for the states in the category described.
For sources, see Table 6A, infra.
Population Deaths/Population
0.58
1.87**
0.29
2.03**
30.468
36.059
25.087
.31.608
30.985
35.057
42.027
32.296
1.09
2.85***
0.51
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Table 4
Insurance Performance Differences between States with and without
Punitive Damages
TOTAL INSURANCE
States without punitive damages:
Michigan
Nebraska
New Hampshire
Washington
Four state totals
States with punitive damages:
Other 46 states and DC
States with insurable punitives
States with uninsurable punitives
States with uncertain insurance rul
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
States without punitive damages:
Michigan
Nebraska
New Hampshire
Washington
Four state totals
States with punitive damages:
Other 46 states and DC
States with insurable ptinitives
States with uninsurable punitives
States with uncertain insurance rul
PRODUCT LIABILITY
States without punitive damages:
Michigan
Nebraska
New Hampshire
Washington
Four state totals
States with punitive damages:
Other 46 states and DC
States with insurable punitives
States with uninsurable punitives
States with uncertain insurance
rules regarding punitives
Premiums Population
(S I 0or 1-00
$9,870,463
$1,738,960
$1,198,307
$4,745,126
$17,552,856
$245,607,234
$65,288,517
$150,312,113
$31,150,917
$193,836
$21,783
$20,696
$97,863
$334,178
$5,637,691
$1,420,860
$3,768,674
$575,187
$74,587
$14,351
$8,336
$38,312
$135,586
$2,024,666
$481,672
$1,295,844
$255,807
245,117
71,043
144,949
30,273
Premiums/Ponulation t-stistic
$1,035
$1,061
$1,044
$871
$988
$1,002 0.18
$919 1.02
$1,037 0.60
$1,029 0.44
245,117
71,043
144,949
30.273
245,117
71,043
144,949
30,273
$8.26 0-54
$6.78 0.96
$8.94 1.11
$8.45 0-76
The second measure in the bottom panel of Table 3, which pertains to all
causes of accidental death, is the overall death rate. Once again, the rates are
somewhat lower in the states without punitive damages, 31.0 versus 35.1.
However, this difference is statistically insignificant. The only statistically
significant difference in the total accidental death results is the higher rate in
states with insurable punitive damages, as compared to the no-punitive damages
states. States with punitive damages are not safer.
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Table 4 Continued
OTHER LIABILITY
States without punitive damages:
Michigan $760,467 9,538 $80
Nebraska $141.883 1,639 $87
New Hampshire $88,891 1,148 $77
Washington $369,689 5,447 $68
Four state totals $1,360,930 17,772 $77
States with punitive damages:
Other 46 states and DC $20,589,828 245.117 $84 0.57
States with insurable punitives $4,759,881 71,043 $67 0.80
States with uninsurable punitives $13,335,308 144,949 $92 1.24
States with uncertain insurance
rules regarding punitives $2,603,478 30,273 $86 0.90
Note: The t-statistic tests the weighted means for the four states which do not award punitive damages against the
weighted mean for the states in the category described.
For sources, see Table 6A, infra.
D. INSURANCE PREMIUM DIFFERENCES
A final set of measures of the risk-averting effects of punitive damages are
insurance premium levels. Punitive damages are often uninsurable under stan-
dard insurance policies. Moreover, eighteen of the forty-six states that allow
punitive damages explicitly prohibit insurance of punitive damages assessed
directly against an insured for its own actions. 13 However, if punitive damages
deter firms from making risky decisions, the risk levels should decline, lowering
the associated premium levels.
To the extent that insurers are willing to provide coverage of punitive
damages, states that permit punitive damages would have higher insurance
premiums. Overall, there is no net significant relationship borne out in the
results below, irrespective of the punitive damages regime or the insurability of
punitive damages. Table 4 presents four different insurance premium measures-
total insurance premiums, medical malpractice premiums, product liability pre-
miums, and other liability premiums. To adjust for state size, the third column
of statistics puts each of these measures in terms of the premium per 1000
residents in the state. The results are consistent in all four cases. The per capita
insurance premium is the same or lower for the average of the four states that do
not recognize punitive damages. Moreover, in every instance, there is no
statistically significant difference between the four no-punitive-damages states
and the rest of the country. These results hold true as well when the comparison
is between states with no punitive damages and each of the three insurability
regimes.
Using insurance premiums as a proxy for risk levels has the same general
implications as do fatality rates: There is no evident effect of punitive awards.
This result is notable because it encompasses two somewhat different conse-
13. See BLATr ET AL., supra note 4, at 77.
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quences of accidents. Accidental deaths involve fatalities for which the mon-
etary loss does not fully capture the social welfare costs. In contrast, insurance
premiums abstract from all non-monetary effects and address only the financial
consequences of risk. The fact that neither measure indicated a decrease in risk
resulting from punitive awards suggests that a broad range of risk-related
actions are insensitive to the deterrent effect of punitive damages.
E. WHITHER THE DETERRENT EFFECT?
If punitive damages do in fact provide deterrence through their financial
penalties on risky actions, states with punitive damages should exhibit superior
performance in some risk dimension. The comprehensive analysis presented
here is more extensive than any previous empirical assessment in the literature.
It addresses accidental fatalities from various sources, a variety of insurance
premium measures, chemical accident data, and toxic chemical discharge statis-
tics. Moreover, it distinguishes states based on the insurance status of punitive
damages. States with punitive damages exhibit no safer risk performance than
states without punitive damages. The statistically significant differences ob-
served follow no clear pattern and would occur by chance given the large
number of statistical tests for differences relative to the four states without
punitive damages. It is instructive to review these statistically significant differ-
ences, as they have no consistent relation to any particular punitive damages-
insurance regime. In Table 1, states with uncertain insurance status had higher,
not lower, levels of toxic chemical accidents and toxic chemical accidents
involving injury. In Table 2, three of the punitive damages groupings (all such
states, states with insurable punitive damages, states with uninsurable punitives,
and states with uncertain punitives insurability) performed worse in terms of the
percent reduction in surface water discharges. For the reduction in total chemi-
cal releases, states without punitives performed better from 1990-1992 and the
same from 1988-1992. States with uninsurable punitives performed better from
1988-1992, but not from 1990-1992. States with uninsurable punitives per-
formed worse over the 1990-1992 period, but not significantly so. However,
these toxic release results are not corroborated by any of the other three toxic
release variables analyzed. The final set of statistically significant differences is
shown in Table 3, which indicates higher medical misadventure deaths and
total accidental death rates for states with insurable punitives and lower
medical misadventure death rates when the insurability of punitive damages is
uncertain.
These statistically significant differences display no consistent direction or
pattern. The more detailed multivariate analysis in the Appendix largely elimi-
nates these effects. Moreover, the differences all involve refined categorizations
of the punitive-damages-insurance regimes. None of the differences pertain to
the overall comparison of states without punitive damages and states that
recognize punitive damages. As is especially apparent in the insurance results in
Table 4, punitive damages do not have a significant deterrent effect. Conse-
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quently, moving to a no-punitive-damages liability regime would sacrifice little
of the deterrence sought by the tort liability system.
The above results are consistent with the views expressed by punitive dam-
ages critics, who observe that random and unpredictable awards will not have a
deterrent effect. Further examination below of the circumstances that some
scholars have identified as potential areas where punitive damages could serve a
productive role will reveal some of the reasons for this lack of efficacy. The set
of such circumstances is both narrowly defined and involves judgments that are
likely beyond a jury's competence.
II. PRINCIPLES FOR CORPORATE RISK DECISIONS
A. THE NATURE OF RISK TRADEOFFS
A conceptual reference point for assessing the role of punitive damages for
corporate, environmental, and safety torts is to begin with the underlying
corporate actions themselves. How should corporations conceptualize risky
decisions, and what guidelines should govern responsible behavior? What is the
institutional context for these acts that gives rise to the environmental and safety
damages? What criterion should be applied in assessing the social desirability of
corporate acts? In the usual parlance of economics, the initial question is
whether there is some kind of market failure whereby private incentives alone
would create inadequate incentives for safety. If there is such a failure, one
should then ask whether compensatory damages and government regulations
suffice, or whether punitive damages are needed to augment these awards to
create appropriate incentives for safety. What do we mean by an appropriate
level of safety?
The standard economic theory of punitive damages and incentives casts the
analysis within a highly stylized situation of certainty.' 4 Does the economic
value of the definite harm resulting from an action exceed the benefits? The task
then becomes setting a damage amount so that the company recognizes the full
costs of its actions and exercises an appropriate degree of care in its activities.
These formulations are overly simplistic, however, because they neglect poten-
tial risks that affect corporate actions and the linkage of the company's behavior
to the societal effects. Particularly with product and environmental risks, the
adverse repercussions of corporate actions usually stem not from deliberate
corporate acts, but from acts that may generate adverse societal effects with
some probability less than one. Indeed, most real catastrophes have very remote
possibilities of occurrence. To understand fully what legal sanctions may be
appropriate when corporate decisions generate social harms, it is necessary to
explicitly account for the tradeoffs inherent in corporate risk decisionmaking.
14. See Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and How Much?, 40 ALA. L.
REv. 1143 (1989). Any uncertainty in Cooter's analysis arises with respect to enforcement error, not
corporate decisions.
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In situations of risk and uncertainty, the appropriate comparison is between
the costs of the safety action and the value of the expected benefits. If the
expected benefits to society of greater safety exceed the expected costs to the
company, decisions to invest in safety are efficient. Similarly, it is not socially
worthwhile to make safety investments when the expected societal benefits are
exceeded by the costs once all social consequences are fully recognized and
valued. One may, nevertheless, wish to compensate those who suffer the
damages costs, even if the risk level is efficient, but this is a distributional and
fairness issue, and is thus outside the scope of this article.
The test for whether safety incentives are adequate requires that one weight
the value of the harms that might occur by the probability that the harms will
occur. 15 Comparing the actual loss of the accident event with the costs of safety
precautions may create a very misleading assessment of the economic desirabil-
ity of precautions. Losses must be weighed by their probability of occurrence,
which may be quite small. If the probability of the accident is very low, the
expected losses (that is, the loss multiplied by its probability) will likewise be
reduced and substantial precautions will not be warranted. To the extent that
juries operating after the fact focus on the actual loss that has occurred, rather
than the expected loss before the risky action, errors in jury behavior will be
particularly great when the probabilities involved are small and the stakes
involved are high.
Consider the following example. Suppose that there is one chance in a
million that there will be a catastrophic loss of $3 billion, which is a figure not
unlike the total social value of the loss of life in a major plane crash. We will
assume this amount represents the full economic value of preventing the crash,
not just the earnings loss. The company could eliminate this risk of an accident
by an expenditure of $10,000. Is it worth it? The expected accident costs
without the safety precaution equal the probability of 1/1,000,000 multiplied by
the $3 billion loss, for a total expected loss of $3000. This figure is far below
the $10,000 amount of additional safety costs. From a benefit-cost standpoint,
there is no economic efficiency justification for additional care. However, if
juries focus on the value of the loss alone, failing to weight it by the probability,
then the comparison after the accident will be between the $3 billion loss and
the $10,000 in safety expenditures. Precautions not only appear warranted, but
failing to take precautions now appears to be reckless and irresponsible given
the differences in the orders of magnitude involved. The first major prerequisite
for thinking sensibly about corporate risk decisions is that the comparison
should be between safety costs and expected incremental benefits of these
expenditures at the time of the corporate action, not the consequences after the
fact when the outcome is known.
15. By the same logic, rare punitive damages awards, even large ones, will not promote safety, just
as periods when the risk of acquiring HIV/AIDS was low did not lead to extensive precautions. See
Tomas J. Philipson, Optimism about AIDS is Premature, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1998, at A22.
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B. TRADEOFFS ARE NECESSARY EVEN WHEN RISKS ARE UNCERTAIN
That the risks are uncertain or may not be precisely known does not displace
the need to compare the costs and expected benefits of greater safety. We may
know, for example, that smoking cigarettes is risky, but not whether the lifetime
mortality risk is 1/6 or 1/3. However, these judgments should be based on the
state of the information at the time of the corporate action, not after the fact.
Such uncertainty involving the need to make judgments with only incomplete
information available are quite common in punitive damages contexts.
Even when the firm has substantial knowledge, it may not know the exact
probability of adverse outcomes. In the McDonald's coffee cup case, 16 the
company had more information about the risk than in most liability contexts but
still was not perfectly knowledgeable. In that case, a woman received a $160,000
award for compensatory damages and a $2.7 million award for punitive dam-
ages after spilling hot coffee on her lap. The punitive damages award was
reduced by the court from its initial jury award level to $480,000, and ultimately
McDonald's settled the case out of court for an undisclosed amount.
How should McDonald's have thought about the temperature selection deci-
sion? At least to a certain degree, higher coffee temperatures enhance the flavor
and keep the coffee warmer longer, which is a benefit to customers. Increased
temperatures, however, may also pose a risk of scalding, particularly in in-
stances in which the consumer is not careful.
McDonald's had two sources of information regarding the risk. 17 First, it
controlled the temperature of the coffee and required that it be served at
temperatures from 180 to 190 degrees Fahrenheit. Skin burn rates increase
exponentially at temperatures above 140 degrees Fahrenheit. If the company
had reduced the temperature of the coffee, it could have converted a situation of
known risks to one in which there was a certainty of no injury. However, for
most commercially viable coffee temperatures, there would be at least some risk
of burn injury. The question is how substantial this risk would be.
A key issue is that McDonald's cannot monitor the extent of consumer
carelessness. How often will purchasers from their drive-through window put
the coffee on their lap or between their knees while driving? Preventing all such
injuries from careless use of a hot product sets the risk level too low and is thus
inefficient. Given the consumer desirability of hot coffee and McDonald's desire
to accommodate consumer preferences, the ideal temperature for coffee should
not be so tepid that no burns would result. The fact that coffee is hot is well
known and readily monitorable once the customer holds the cup. The appropri-
ate approach to the liability issue is to ask whether McDonald's struck an
appropriate balance between costs and benefits, recognizing the effects for the
16. See Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-121419, 1995 WL 360309
(D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994).
17. For a detailed discussion of the information available to McDonald's, see S. Reed Morgan,
McDonald's Burned Itself, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 19, 1994, at 26.
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entire market and the reasonable judgments McDonald's could make; the
liability issue should not focus solely on the situation for the individual plaintiff
who was harmed or that individual's possibly idiosyncratic carelessness.
Although McDonald's could not monitor all such behavior, it did have some
consumer reports of injuries. Using such information, as well as scientific
evidence on temperatures that lead to scalding and burns, one could then pose
the coffee safety issue in the following manner: Reducing the temperature of the.
coffee would decrease the expected number of injuries; one would want to
weight the value of these injuries to account for not only the monetary losses
but also the value of any health effects to the injured individuals. If, however,
the coffee temperature is lowered, the company will presumably lose profits
because of decreased coffee sales. There may also be diminished welfare to
consumers, including those who still purchase the coffee, because of the more
tepid coffee temperature. From an economic efficiency standpoint, McDonald's
should lower the temperature of the coffee so long as the reduction in the
expected costs to the injured consumers exceeds the expected benefits both to
the consumers and the company from hot coffee. Indeed, in a subsequent coffee
bum case, Judge Frank Easterbrook posed the tradeoff in exactly this manner.'
8
The appropriate assessment should consequently be from the standpoint of
the entire market, taking into account the preferences of all consumers and the
injuries to all consumers. The issue is not what temperature makes sense for
consumers who drive with coffee on their lap because McDonald's cannot
distinguish its customers based on their level of care. The typical focus of court
cases, however, is not .on the market choice but on consumers who have
experienced isolated injuries which often have a small associated probability of
occurrence. Court cases by their very nature focus on individuals, whereas
regulation and legislation is better suited to dealing with markets. Preventing
such injuries would involve substantial costs across a product line to make the
necessary improvements for a mass-marketed product.
Matters become more complex when there is uncertainty regarding the risk
probability. Even safety experts may sharply disagree on such probabilities. A
dramatic example of uncertainty is with respect to scientific debates over the
"doomsday rock." Some astronomers have hypothesized that a large asteroid
will someday hit the earth and have catastrophic consequences, a phenomenon
that captured the fantasy of Hollywood scriptwriters in 1998.19 Scientists from
Cornell University, who have sought government funding to support a research
program for rockets to divert or destroy such asteroids, estimated our risk of
death as being as high as 1/6000.20 An arguably more realistic assessment of the
risk from a consensus group of scientists estimates the individual risk of death
18. See McMahon v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp, No. 97-4131, 1998 WL 351294 (7th Cir. July 2, 1998).
19. See ARMAGEDDON (Touchstone Pictures 1998); DEEP IMPACT (Paramount Pictures and Dream-
works L.L.C. and Amblin Entertainment 1998).
20. See William J. Broad, Asteroids, a Menace to Early Life, Could Still Destroy Earth, N.Y. TtIMEs,
June 18, 1991, at Cl.
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from the doomsday rock as 1/2,000,000.21 This broad range of scientific judg-
ment reflects the extent of our ignorance regarding the magnitude of the risk and
the presence of substantial uncertainty.
Such divergences of opinion are not restricted to extraterrestrial battles.
Similar kinds of uncertainties are present with respect to highly litigated
products such as breast implants. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
banned silicon breast implants from the market, citing the presence of substan-
tial hazards, whereas the American Medical Association continued to issue press
releases indicating that the risks appeared to be small.22 The most recent
scientific evidence fails to indicate a significant risk, though risks that do not
lead to signature diseases, such as the mesothelioma risk from asbestos, are
often difficult to link to product exposures.23 These uncertainties have not
impeded the courts from awarding punitive damages to women with breast
implants.
Our inability to pinpoint risk levels was also evident in the case of "low"
risks from British beef. Scientists in England faced uncertainties in 1996 about
the risks of "mad cow" disease from eating British beef. Estimates of the
ultimate fatalities from Creutzfeldt-Jakobs disease range from 500 to 500,000
deaths in Britain.2 4 This enormous gap in the estimated level of risk provides
little information to make sound judgments about the consequences of beef
consumption for the British.
Another extreme example of persistent uncertainty is the catastrophe involv-
ing TWA Flight 800.25 Even after months of investigation, it is not entirely clear
whether the cause of the accident was a bomb, a missile, or a mechanical
failure. The determination of the cause of the accident has a potentially signifi-
cant impact on TWA's ultimate liability. Moreover, even if the accident occurred
due to some kind of structural failure, unless the cause of that failure can be
identified, the appropriate precaution warranted would not be known. The result
has been that TWA has adopted a more diffuse set of safety reforms-increased
airline security and efforts to decrease the risk of explosion for fuel tanks.
Information gathered over time can be helpful but not always definitive.
Recent problems encountered with automobile airbags indicate that even for
some safety-related products with substantial opportunities for gathering safety
data, it may take time for knowledge to develop. Automobile companies can
learn about the properties of airbags through crash tests as well as through
21. See The Threat from Space, ECONOMIST, Sept. 11, 1993, at 13.
22. For a summary of the debate between the American Medical Association's Council on Scientific
Affairs claiming that there is no convincing evidence that breast implants caused health problems and
the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, see John Schwartz, FDA and AMA Clash on
Breast Implants, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1993, at A4.
23. See MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE
BREAST IMPLANT CASE 90-110 (1996).
24. See Mad Cows and Englishmen, ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1996, at 25.
25. See Robert W. Hahn, The Cost of Antiterrorist Rhetoric, 19 REGULATION 51, 51-57 (1996); see
also Matthew L. Wald, April 5-11: Rewiring Urged, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1998, at S4.
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market experience. Because fatalities caused by airbags are a relatively rare
event-with about fifty estimated fatalities to date 6 -the risk consequences of
airbags and the particular risks they pose to children, small adults, and the
elderly were not immediately apparent. Moreover, evidence on the benefits of
airbags is based on engineering model projections rather than tallies of actual
lives saved. Mirroring juries' tendency to focus on the harm caused in the
individual case rather than on the defendant-corporation's pre-accident risk-
benefit assessment, the public has responded with greater concern for the
identified lives lost than the more hypothetical estimated lives saved.
Problems posed by continuing uncertainties plague even the most expert risk
assessors. The consequences of mistaken judgments are particularly severe in
zero-infinity problems, that is, those situations in which either there is no loss or
the loss is catastrophic. A recent financial catastrophe affected the most vener-
able insurance institution, Lloyd's of London. Lloyd's persistently underesti-
mated the scope of the asbestos litigation, for which it served as a major
reinsurer. Lloyd's 1982 worst-case scenario of the total number of asbestos
cases that would emerge was 81,000. The company later developed an asses-
ment of the total number of claims, updating its estimate to 180,000 in 1990.27
These estimates remained considerably below the American Bar Association's
estimate of the litigation level, which was 340,000 claims in 1990.28 The
outcome for Lloyd's is that it has thus far survived, but it has had to undergo a
major reorganization along with the imposition of substantial losses upon many
Lloyd's "names."
The occurrence of substantial losses in this as well as other zero-infinity
contexts does not necessarily imply that the decisions themselves were bad. The
appropriate reference point for judging these decisions is whether they were
sound at the time when they were made, not whether the decisionmaker was
unlucky. The high losses that occurred are simply a reflection of the nature of
the stakes and the risks involved. In the case of Lloyd's, the possibility of
catastrophic losses arose from the positively correlated nature of mass toxic tort
lawsuits. Rather than incurring a series of independent and identically distrib-
uted risks, it encountered many highly correlated risks that imposed consider-
able losses once juries found the asbestos firms liable.2 9 Corporations likewise
engage in high stakes decisions-whether it be a small risk of environmental
disaster or a hazard from a mass marketed consumer product that could injure
26. See Car Safety for the Irresponsible, ECONOMIST, Nov. 30, 1996, at 29.
27. See Nicholas Sinfield, Asbestos-Human or Natural Disaster? (1994) (paper presented at the
Stanford University Conference on Social Treatment of Catastrophic Risk) (on file with author).
28. For further discussion of the evolving scientific knowledge regarding asbestos, see W. Kip
Viscusi, Alternative Institutional Responses to Asbestos, J. OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 147 (1996) and
the references contained therein.
29. A recent award in a Florida asbestos case levied a $31 million punitive damages penalty on
Owens Coming Fiberglas Corp. See Ballard v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., No. CL-93-1087-AD
(Fl. Cir. Ct. Jan. 21, 1997) (verdict) (discussed in 25 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 103 (Jan. 31,
1997)).
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thousands. The appropriate reference point for judging such risk decisions is
whether they were prudent given their expected consequences. A zero risk ideal
will not be feasible.
C. RISK BALANCING IN PERSONAL DECISIONS
We cannot blame all hazards on corporate actions and bad decisions. More-
over, corporations are not unique in making tradeoffs involving risk that may
not produce perfect safety. Risks are an inescapable part of our daily lives. The
sources of risks that increase one's annual death risk by 1 in a 1,000,000 include
the following: drinking a half a liter of wine, living two days in New York or
Boston (air pollution), traveling ten minutes by bicycle, traveling 150 miles by
car, eating forty tablespoons of peanut butter, or eating 100 charcoal broiled
steaks. 30 Although we might wish to reduce the risks in our life, few of us
would be willing to give up all of our daily activities, many of which generate
risks. We make risk tradeoffs every day, and corporations must engage in a
similar balancing.
The infeasibility of attaining a zero-risk outcome stems from the fact that the
cost of risk reduction increases as the level of the risk declines. 3 1 Because
achieving risk reductions gets increasingly more expensive as we improve our
levels of safety, at some point it is desirable to stop our quest for reducing one
type of risk and use our resources for greater risk reduction elsewhere. Sources
of personal risks include smoking, failure to use seatbelts, lack of exercise, and
poor diets. Even the most disciplined safety-minded consumers indulge in some
risky activities. Travel is inherently risky, whether by plane or by car. To the
extent that we drive smaller, fuel-efficient cars, we incur greater risks. Cars that
resembled tanks would be safer, but more expensive and more cumbersome to
operate. Our daily lives are not governed by a single-minded commitment to
safety but by the need to strike a reasonable balance between safety and other
concerns, such as our desire to travel or occasional enjoyment of a decadent
dessert. The task of the legal system is to provide incentives for corporations to
strike an appropriate balance using appropriate societal values for the benefits of
improved safety as our guide.
D. ECONOMIC RESOURCES ARE LIMITED
Consider what would happen if we did not attempt to strike such a reasonable
balance but instead sought to achieve zero risks at any cost. Suppose, for
example, that all societal resources were devoted to accident reduction. Even if
we spent all our money for this purpose, the United States economy would only
30. See Richard Wilson, Analyzing the Daily Risks of Life, TECH. REv., Feb. 1979, at 45.
31. For an example of the rising marginal costs of risk reduction, see W. Kip Viscusi, RISK BY
CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE (1983). Also see the discussion below of
Justice Breyer's 90-10 principle, infra note 38 and accompanying text.
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have enough resources to spend less than $60 million per accidental fatality.32
These expenditures would leave us nothing to spend on food, cancer prevention,
environmental quality, medical care, or many other worthwhile expenditures.
There are limits as to how much safety we can efficiently achieve and, accord-
ingly, on the amounts we should spend. In some cases, government regulations
have cost more than $60 million per fatality. Some, such as the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) formaldehyde standard, cost in the
billions. Such expenditure levels on risk prevention are not possible across the
board since incurring them would bankrupt the economy.
Notably, even in the areas that have been the targets of major government
regulation, we are not risk-free. After more than a quarter of a century of risk
and environmental regulation, substantial hazards remain.33 We are safer than
before, in part because of society's greater affluence, but we are not risk-free.
On average, we continue to face an annual risk of motor-vehicle accidents of
1/5000, an annual risk of job accidents per worker of just under 1/10,000, an
annual risk of death and injury in a home accident of 1/11,000, and an annual
risk of an aviation accident of 1/250,000. 3 4 The continued existence of these
risks does not necessarily imply that regulatory agencies have been remiss.
Rather, they indicate that zero risk levels are unachievable.
Perhaps the main exception to the infeasibility of the quest for attaining zero
risk is the Delaney Clause.35 Under this clause, the FDA prohibits all food
additives that pose any risk of cancer. More specifically, the Delaney Clause
states that "no additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to induce cancer
when ingested by man or animal, or if it is found, after tests which are
appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of food additives, to induce cancer in
man or animal."-36 Despite this zero-risk ideal for food additives, considerable
natural and synthetic sources of cancer risk remain in our diets. Natural
carcinogens include chemicals contained in apples, pears, broccoli, basil, alco-
hol, peanut butter, coffee, lettuce, and a wide variety of other staples of very
healthy diets.37 There are also risks that arise from human action, ranging from
pesticide residues to saccharin as an artificial sweetener. Moreover, how much
we eat and the character of what we eat, such as the consumption of fatty foods,
have profound implications for the riskiness of our diet. Even substantial
vigilance and dietary planning will not result in a risk-free diet.
32. This calculation is discussed further in W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK (1992).
33. In addition to accident risks cited below, there are also other hazards such as a risk of homicide,
risks of morbidity and mortality from air pollution, risks of skin cancer from ultraviolet radiation, and
risks of being killed by an airbag, among many other hazards.
34. See W. Kip Viscusi, SMOKING: MAKING THE RISKY DECISION 24 (1992). These data in turn are
based on data drawn from NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS (various years).
35. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1994).
36. Id. The statutory language for color additives is identical. See 21 U.S.C. § 379e(b)(5)(B) (1994).
37. See Bruce N. Ames et al., Ranking Possible Carcinogenic Hazards, 236 SCIENCE 271, 271-80
(1987); Lois S. Gold et al., Rodent Carcinogens: Setting Priorities, 258 SCIENCE 261, 263 (1992).
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E. ELIMINATING RISK BECOMES INORDINATELY COSTLY
The exorbitant costs of reducing risks to a zero level is reflected in what
Justice Breyer refers to as the "90-10 principle." He gives the example of the
Superfund program:
Let me provide some examples. The first comes from a case in my own
court, United States v. Ottati & Goss, arising out of a ten-year effort to force
cleanup of a toxic waste dump in southern New Hampshire. The site was
mostly cleaned up. All but one of the private parties had settled. The remain-
ing private party litigated the cost of cleaning up the last little bit, a cost of
about $9.3 million to remove a small amount of highly diluted PCBs and
"volatile organic compounds" (benzene and gasoline components) by inciner-
ating the dirt. How much extra safety did this $9.3 million buy? The forty-
thousand-page record of this ten-year effort indicated (and all the parties
seemed to agree) that, without the extra expenditure, the waste dump was
clean enough for children playing on the site to eat small amounts of dirt daily
for 70 days each year without significant harm. Burning the soil would have
made it clean enough for the children to eat small amounts daily for 245 days
per year without significant harm. But there were no dirt-eating children
playing in the area, for it was a swamp. Nor were dirt-eating children likely to
appear there, for future building seemed unlikely. The parties also agreed that
at least half of the volatile organic chemicals would likely evaporate by the
year 2000. To spend $9.3 million to protect non-existent dirt-eating children is
what I mean by the problem of "the last 10 percent." 38
In practice, the drop-off in the efficacy of hazardous waste cleanup expendi-
tures may be even steeper. Justice Breyer hypothesized that the government
spreads 90% of its resources to eliminate the last 10% of the risk. Put somewhat
differently, it eliminates 90% of the risk by the most effective 10% of its
expenditures. In practice, the initial expenditures are even more effective than
Justice Breyer conjectured, as the Superfund program achieves over 99% of its
risk reduction with the first 5% of the total cleanup expenditures that it requires
for the hazardous waste sites.3 9 However, the essential point of Justice Breyer's
example is certainly correct. The initial large risk reductions come the cheapest.
As we spend more money to reduce risk, it becomes increasingly expensive to
achieve risk reductions. Indeed, Breyer's hypothesis that eliminating the last
10% of the risk costs us 90% of our risk reduction dollar is not an unrealistic
indicator of the dramatic declines in the efficacy of risk reducing expenditures.
Because of this rapid drop-off in the efficiency of risk reduction expenditures, it
is imperative to ask how much safety is really desirable. And, whether other
uses of the money would produce more safety benefits.
38. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 11-12 (1993).
39. See W. Kip Viscusi and James T. Hamilton, Cleaning up Superfund, PUB. INTEREST, Summer
1996, at 52-60. Both public and private parties contribute to these expenditures.
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F. RANDOM EVENTS AND IMPERFECT CORPORATE CONTROL LIMIT RISK REDUCTION
Failure to recognize the limits of risk-reducing expenditures often leads to
unrealistic goals. When the Occupational Safety and Health Act was passed,
legislators predicted dramatic declines in job risks would result from the bill. n°
Similarly, projections of the efficacy of seatbelts in reducing motor vehicle
fatalities greatly overstated the extent of the improvement that occurred n.4 The
ideal of perfect safety has proven to be an illusory goal.
One source of limits to improving safety is that both people and technology
matter. Companies cannot simply select a risk-free technology. Even very safe
technologies do not eliminate all sources of risk. Most government regulatory
efforts have focused on technological improvements, such as improved guard-
ing on machines and passive restraint systems for cars, rather than making
people more safety conscious. Influencing the actions of the individuals who
also may contribute to risk is sometimes a concern as well, particularly with
respect to hazard warnings. However, it is difficult to eliminate all risky
behaviors.
Furthermore, increases in safety technology may make it less imperative for
people to take protective action, thus impeding safety improvements. Since
seatbelts make cars safer, it becomes less important for drivers to exercise
care.4 2 In addition, people may overestimate the efficacy of technological
improvements to safety and fail to take the appropriate level of care. In my
analysis of safety caps, I show that people are often lulled into a false sense of
security by treating child safety caps as being risk-free, leaving containers with
such caps around the house and exposed to children. 4 3 The mechanism underly-
ing this effect was the subject of a more thorough exploration with respect to
cigarette lighters. There is evidence that parents believe that safety mechanisms
for cigarette lighters dramatically improve their safety. This improvement in
safety characteristics decreases parents' concerns about the location of the
lighter and the exposure of children to cigarette lighters.
44
Overall statistics suggest that worker actions may be quite prominent sources
of risk. Pilot error is responsible for 85% of all airplane accidents.45 From
45-88% of workers' compensation cases involve accidents in which worker
behavior played a contributory role.4 6 A study by OSHA found that the majority
40. See Viscusi, supra note 32.
41. See Sam Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 677, 679
(1975) (arguing that auto safety regulation has not affected the highway death rate).
42. See id. This is the classic problem of moral hazard.
43. For a summary of this evidence, see Viscusi, supra note 32.
44. See W. Kip Viscusi & Gerald 0. Cavallo, The Effect of Product Safety Regulation on Safety
Precautions, 15 RISK ANALYsIS 917, 921 (1994).
45. See W. Kip Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 8 (1991).
46. Some of the substantial role of worker behavior stems from false reporting of accidents. Over a
five-year period, 200 Chicago Transit Authority employees accounted for 1200 injury claims. This high
concentration of injuries suggest possible fraud or misrepresentation, not simply that these workers are
riskier. For further discussion, see Viscusi, supra note 32, at 178.
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of deaths of deep sea divers in the North Sea could be traced to worker behavior
rather than inadequacies in technology.47
What these results mean for company behavior is that consumers and workers
are often major contributors to accidents and that technology changes alone will
not eliminate risk. The policy levers that can be most readily manipulated by a
corporation are changes in product design, changes in the technology of the
workplace, and similar technological improvements. Corporations have much
more difficulty altering human behavior. Consumers take actions on a decentral-
ized basis. How they use a product cannot be monitored by a corporation. A
company can provide hazard warnings, as McDonald's now writes "HOT!
HOT!" across the top of its coffee cups. In the case of very potent risks, there
can be requirements of safety training, such as the certified pesticide applicators
requirement for using dangerous pesticides and the requirement that a motor-
vehicle license be obtained before driving a car. However, a corporation cannot
deploy safety managers to accompany consumers while they are using products
because of the decentralized nature of this activity. Juries may ignore this lack
of control as one jury did when it awarded $25 million in punitive damages to
the heirs of a woman who drove around a lowered railroad-crossing gate and
was killed.48
Decentralized decisions do not, however, imply no corporate control. Profit
centers within organizations provide localized incentives. Indeed, if inefficien-
cies escalated with respect to firm size, the large firm in the economy would be
the least profitable. Large firms, which are the safest in terms of accident
records for workers on the job, would face the greatest financial risk.49
Worker behavior is an intermediate case. Companies can establish guidelines
for worker behavior and can also control worker behavior more readily than
consumer behavior. However, companies cannot continuously monitor the safety-
related behaviors of all workers. Supervisors may be able to observe whether
protective equipment is being worn and other visible indicators of safety when
production is in a group context. However, the difficulty of eliminating all
unsafe behaviors is reflected in the continued dominance of worker actions as a
contributory cause of job accidents. Just as companies cannot entirely control
risk because they cannot entirely control consumers, workers are at risk in part
because they do not have complete control over coworkers' actions.
Thus, in large corporations, random errors arise both for technological perfor-
mance and worker behavior. In the case of technologies, firms have organiza-
47. See ViscusI, supra note 45, at 11.
48. See Wightman v. Courail, No. E-97-001, 1997 WL 614962 (Ohio App. Sept. 30, 1997). The trial
judge reduced the punitive damages award to $15 million, and an Ohio appellate court affirmed the
award.
49. This greater safety is due in part to the stronger merit rating of workers' compensation premiums
for large firms. However, if employers in large firms were not responsive to incentives, no such
influence would be observed. See Michael J. Moore & W. Kip Viscusi, Promoting Safety Through
Workers' Compensation, 20 RAND J. OF ECON. 4, 499-515 (1989).
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tional control over the choice of technology but not over all aspects of its
performance. Equipment runs the risk of failing just as the Challenger space
shuttle ran the risk of a booster rocket exploding. Similarly, firms can prescribe
behavior for workers, but unless they incur inefficiently high levels of monitor-
ing costs some risk of worker failure remains.
The bureaucratic nature of corporate decisionmaking introduces an aspect of
uncertainty into risk decisions. The difficulties in maintaining corporate control,
and in recognizing the difference between central decisions by a corporation and
decentralized mistaken actions within a corporation, are reflected in the Ameri-
can Law Institute's recommended principles guiding the award of punitive
damages: "An enterprise should be liable for punitive damages only when there
is clear and convincing evidence of reckless disregard for the safety of others in
the decisions made by management officials or other senior personnel."
50
As the potential independent causes of an accident proliferate, the culpability
for not taking a particular precaution decreases. Companies faced with risk
situations in which multiple independent causes combine will have a cloudier
notion of the likely consequences of safety improvements than in well-defined
risk situations. From the standpoint of corporate decisionmaking, the multiplic-
ity of possible risk sources and the absence of a sound understanding of the risk
level tend to mute the perceived efficacy of precautionary actions. Before the
accident, the appropriate precaution is less clear-cut than after the fact.
Furthermore, in some cases, substantial uncertainties may remain even after
the accident, as in the case of the crash of TWA Flight 800. Whether the
extensive security requirements enacted after such accidents produce benefits
exceeding the substantial costs and delays imposed on passengers depends in
large part on the likelihood of such accidents in the future.
III. PuNITIVE DAMAGES ARE NOT NEEDED FOR DETERRENCE
A. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES ARE GENERALLY ADEQUATE FOR DETERRENCE
The assessment of risk measures in Part I failed to reveal any deterrent effect
of punitive damages; on a practical level, punitive awards do not enhance
safety. This Part addresses a somewhat different issue; that is, even if punitive
damages did enhance deterrence, is there any need for them to augment the
safety incentives provided by compensatory awards?
For a large class of circumstances, compensatory damages alone provide
adequate deterrence. Consider a case in which all accident costs are financial or
involve monetary equivalents. In the case of nonmonetary losses such as
environmental damage, the economic assumption is that from the standpoint of
those who are injured, this loss can be translated into a fixed amount of money.
In such circumstances, both strict liability and negligence rules create efficient
50. 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITrE, supra note 2, at 264 (1991) (discussing the merits and disadvan-
tages of ceilings and multipliers).
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levels of safety.51 In particular, the financial incentives facing the injurer will be
adequate to ensure appropriate levels of deterrence.
From an efficiency standpoint then, there is no rationale for additional
sanctions. Penalties that go beyond those needed to create an efficient level of
safety will produce safety benefits that are not commensurate with the costs
being incurred, and these costs in turn will lead to higher prices and other
adverse economic effects. Policies for which the benefits to society are ex-
ceeded by the costs are not in our net national interest.
Although punitive damages are not generally warranted, there are some
narrowly defined circumstances in which analysts have suggested that they
could play a potentially constructive role. The discussion below will outline the
circumstances that have been identified in which punitive damages can poten-
tially promote more efficient levels of safety. I will then assess the importance
of these circumstances and compare these potential benefits of punitive dam-
ages with the adverse effects that punitive damages generate.
Table 5
Theoretical Factors Triggering the Pertinence of Punitive Damages
FACTOR PROBLEM SOLUTION
Enforcement Error Probability that harm will go Multiply compensatory
undetected and/or unpunished. damages by the reciprocal of
the enforcement probability.
Gap between Compensatory Optimal compensation from Impose a fine, regulatory
Damages for Adequate insurance standpoint provides penalty, or use punitive
Deterrence inadequate deterrence, damages as a deterrence
penalty.
Malicious Intent Party causing accident derives Increase damages to offset
enjoyment from inflicting such enjoyment.
harm that may affect value of
loss to victim. Usually not
relevant for corporate
behavior.
B. POTENTIAL TRIGGERS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
5 2
Any efficiency-based rationale for going beyond compensatory damages to
assess a punitive award requires that conditions other than those in the standard
economic loss model be met. Table 5 summarizes the three situations in which,
theoretically, punitive damages may be relevant--enforcement error, a gap
between compensatory damages and the deterrence value, and malicious intent.
Satisfying at least one of the criteria is a prerequisite for having apotentially
51. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1989).
52. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3, for a more detailed review of these principles.
1998]
HeinOnline  -- 87 Geo. L.J. 311 1998-1999
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
sound basis for awarding punitive damages regarding certain corporate acts or
actions which might have had probabilistic elements.
The first of the three hypothesized justifications for punitive damages is an
enforcement error. Suppose the compensatory damage amount would have
provided optimal deterrence, as with monetary harms. However, if an enforce-
ment error creates the probability that the corporation will not suffer this
sanction, then there is a rationale for increasing the damages level if tort
liability is the only source of financial incentives for safety. A series of authors
have shown that compensatory damages provide appropriate deterrence in a
situation of imperfect enforcement after the compensatory amount has been
multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability that the sanction will be im-
posed.53 This formulation ensures that the expected penalty facing the firm
equals the optimal deterrence value, taking into account the probability that it
will not be levied.
One should, however, be careful in interpreting this underenforcement ratio-
nale since courts do limit the extent of liability to exclude many cases of remote
risks for which enforcement is difficult. For maritime cases, the circle of harm is
limited to those directly affected by the accident.54 Transaction costs would
escalate if all indirect effects were taken into account because the ramifications
of any favorable or adverse event throughout the economy are extensive.55
Moreover, it is not clear that accidents create net indirect losses. Damages paid
by companies will also stimulate the economy through a variety of indirect
efforts, so for symmetry purposes, it is inappropriate to penalize companies for
indirect losses without crediting them for the indirect benefits generated by the
damage payment. Similarly, benefit-cost analysis for government regulations do
not include indirect effects because other expenditures likewise would have
indirect consequences.
Even if one acknowledges the role of enforcement error in muting the effect
of compensatory damages on incentives, this factor may not be particularly
pertinent for corporate risk decisions. The usual example of an enforcement
error problem is midnight dumping of toxic chemicals. Creating environmental
hazards in this manner is explicitly designed to evade enforcement. If there is
some probability the polluter will not be caught, compensatory damages will
lead to expected sanctions that are less then what is needed for efficient
deterrence. Thus, it would seem that additional sanctions in the form of punitive
damages would be needed to create appropriate incentives.
However, the tort liability system is not the only institutional actor. The
53. See Cooter, supra note 14, and the references contained therein.
54. See Robbins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U. S. 303, 307-08 (1927) (Holmes, J.)
(holding that tortfeasor is not liable to person other than person injured merely because injured person
was under contract with such other person unknown to tortfeasor).
55. For a more recent discussion of economic rationales for limiting the scope of liability, see
Barber Lines A/S v. MIV Dona Maru, 764 F2d 50, 52-54 (1 st Cir. 1985).
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Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 56 (RCRA) imposes sanctions for
reckless disposal of hazardous wastes, such as the midnight dumping example.
Thus, in addition to potential compensatory damages, other societal mecha-
nisms exist to promote safety and environmental quality. As will be indicated
below in the discussion of the role of regulation more generally, much of the
belief in the need for stringent punitive damages stems from a tort-centric
perspective that ignores the role of such other societal institutions.
For the most part, corporate actions do not follow the clandestine nature of
midnight dumping. McDonald's, for example, could not disavow that it had sold
the coffee that spilled on the unfortunate woman's lap. The manufacturers of
Ford Pintos and GMC trucks likewise could not evade enforcement because the
identities of these vehicles were apparent, and the mass-produced nature of the
products led to risks that were well known and highly publicized.57 Moreover,
the fact that there may be underenforcement for some classes of behavior does
not imply that this rationale for punitive damages can be used for corporate acts
in which there is no significant enforcement error.
Even if there is a situation with enforcement error and no regulatory incen-
tives, it is not clear that juries can make sensible judgments on this issue. The
analytic task for jurors is extremely complex. In a court case, there presumably
is no enforcement error: the firm has been identified. The jury must conse-
quently make an enforcement error judgment across an entire market or set of
activities. This task is nontrivial even if no other courts will award punitive
damages. However, if other cases involving the risky behavior also might
generate punitive damages, then incentives will be too great if punitive damages
are set in each case by a jury which is assuming that no other punitive damages
will be awarded. In practice, punitive damages in one jurisdiction often lead to
efforts to obtain punitive damages in similar cases, which in turn may lead the
defendant to settle such cases out of court even if the case is not litigated. Juries
have no reliable basis for anticipating the snowball effect of their punitive
damages award on other court awards. Failure to recognize the potential ramifi-
cations of a punitive award will lead to excessive deterrence.
A second potential role of punitive damages arises when the appropriate
deterrence values of damage and efficient compensation amounts differ. This
situation pertains to the character of the accident rather than the size of the loss.
In particular, does the accident do more than simply lower welfare as would
losing a fixed sum of money? Does it, for example also impede our ability to
enjoy spending money on consumption activities? This situation may occur for
severe health effects such as brain damage, which impedes an accident victim's
ability to derive well-being from a court award. Accidents that cause fatalities or
severely disabling injuries are also prime examples. In these instances, compen-
56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92 (1988).
57. GM also had internal analyses documenting its risk analysis. See E.C. Ivey, Value Analysis of
Auto Fuel, GM Memorandum (June 29, 1973) (on file with author).
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satory damages amounts may not provide adequate deterrence because the value
of preventing irreplaceable health losses, such as in the case of death, goes
beyond the monetary sums involved.
The implicit deterrence value of life associated with preventing a small risk
of death ranges from $3-$7 million per statistical life, with the midpoint value
of $5 million.58 Court awards for compensatory damages after fatalities are
typically well below that amount. Compensatory damages are intended to ease
the financial burdens of the survivors rather than to restore the well being of the
deceased or provide efficient deterrence. In contrast, punitive damages could
serve a deterrence function that goes beyond the compensation function to
reflect the value to society of preventing the risky outcome.
Using punitive damages for deterrence is not ideal, however, as it provides
compensation to accident victims or their estates that exceeds the optimal
insurance value of their loss. Punitive awards for nonmonetary losses are not in
consumers' interest because they will, in effect, pay for the unwanted insurance
provided by these damages through higher product prices. 59 People will be
forced to pay for a level of tort liability insurance beyond what they would buy
on their own in a world of perfect insurance markets.
Government fines and regulatory penalties are superior mechanisms to puni-
tive damages because they create incentives without overinsurance. As will be
documented below, the market sanction is $3-$7 million for each fatality. When
job markets for employment risks or product markets for consumption risks
function effectively, they will transmit incentives for safety through higher
wages for risky jobs and lower prices for hazardous products. If operative, this
economic mechanism will meet the deterrence objective, and the courts can
focus on their compensatory role. Even if market incentives fall short, imperfect
market incentives when coupled with compensatory damages may generate
incentives for safety that may be adequate or possibly even too great. That
punitive damages are not in widespread use for wrongful death actions .may
indicate that neglect of safety is typically not so extreme in most cases that
punitive financial penalties are needed.
The third situation in which there may be a trigger for punitive damages is
malicious behavior, as in intentional torts. The enjoyment that parties derive
from inflicting harm may well be viewed as a socially unacceptable component
of the behavior. As indicated in Table 5, such concerns seem more pertinent to
personal actions than corporate ones. A punitive damages amount that offsets
the injurer's enjoyment from causing the accident will establish the additional
incentives needed for the appropriate degree of care. 60 Given the scope of
58. See Viscusi, supra note 32, at 73.
59. See Viscusi, supra note 45.
60. See Peter Diamond, Efficiency Effects of Punitive Damages, Department of Economics, Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology Working Paper No. 97-17 (Sept. 1997); Peter Diamond, Integrating
Punishment and Efficiency Concerns in Punitive Damages for Reckless Disregard of Risks to Others,
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actions considered in this article-corporate environmental and safety torts-
this rationale for punitive damages is not pertinent.
If the compensatory damage amount imposed on the company creates appro-
priate incentives, then there is no role for punitive damages. When this condi-
tion is not met, one of the three potential triggers of punitive damages must be
present for there to be any role for a punitive award. In environmental and
safety torts, however, the malicious intent concern is largely irrelevant, so the
principal factors that could trigger punitive damages are enforcement error and
deterrence for health effects. In most situations of corporate acts, enforcement
error is not a major concern or is beyond a jury's competence. Indeed, such
judgments would be quite difficult to make even for sophisticated legal scholars.
Compensation for health losses to promote deterrence provides overinsurance.
Whether punitive damages have a constructive role in such contexts depends in
large part on the other societal incentive mechanisms in place. The subsequent
discussion explores why, put simply, corporations will not completely ignore
safety in the absence of tort liability.
What are the broader ramifications of this review of the theoretical underpin-
nings of punitive damages? The theoretical case for punitive damages is re-
stricted to narrowly defined circumstances for which, as I have demonstrated,
the rationale for punitive damages is not compelling. This rather shaky theoreti-
cal foundation may in fact help explain why in practice punitive damages have
not proven to be an effective deterrent. Punitive damages can, at best, play a
limited role in specific contexts likely to be beyond a jury's expertise, such as
making complicated statistical judgments regarding the size of the enforcement
error based on a case when the defendant has in fact been identified. Indeed, it is
noteworthy that the articles supporting punitive damages do not give any actual
case examples where juries have made awards in line with the theoretical ideal
but instead focus on hypothetical case studies in which the author attempts to
bring to bear more clarity than has yet been evident in our court system. The
court's performance has produced no demonstrable safety benefits.
C. MARKET FORCES PROMOTE SAFETY
How juries make the assessment that the firm has been sufficiently remiss to
warrant punitive damages is unclear. Juries may fail not only in their thinking
about the expected benefits of greater safety but also in their analysis of the
costs of accidents to the firm. In thinking about the adequacy of corporate
incentives, it should be recognized that the court system is not the only
institution that affects corporate behavior. Unfortunately, most of the legal
literature suffers from a tort-centric perspective in which the courts are the only
social institution at work. The courts are not the only safety incentive mecha-
nism in place. For firms that sell risky products in the market or hire workers
Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Working Paper No. 97-19 (Oct.
1997).
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into risky jobs, there may be a market response to risky activity, such as an
unwillingness to fly ValuJet after a crash. Indeed, economists' estimates of the
implicit value of life are based on observed wage premiums for risky jobs and
higher prices now commanded by safer products in the market. These substan-
tial market premiums are in the range of $3-$7 million per statistical life.6 t
The source of these values is analysis of compensating differentials for risk,
controlling for various aspects of the worker's job. It is useful to provide some
sense of the nature of these studies, which in turn indicates the prevalence of
these market incentives for risk.62 There have been numerous studies of compen-
sating differentials that workers receive for hazardous jobs in the United States
as well as in many other countries, such as Australia and Japan. The basic idea
of these studies is to analyze statistically the wage premium workers receive for
added risk on the job. The typical worker in the United States faces an annual
job-related fatality risk of 1/10,000.63 In return, the worker receives an average
wage premium of $500, where this amount has been estimated by controlling
statistically for other aspects of the worker and the job. On average, 10,000
workers would receive a total of $5 million (10,000 workers times $500 per
worker) in return for the one expected statistical death among them. Thus, the
value of a statistical life is $5 million.
It is important to understand what this number means. It is not the value a
person must receive to be indifferent between certain death and life. No amount
of money may suffice. Nor is it the value that one would purchase in a life
insurance policy. Desired compensation for one's heirs will be much less.
Rather, it simply reflects the risk-money tradeoff from the standpoint of preven-
tion. This amount would be pertinent for setting punitive damages from a
deterrence standpoint if compensatory damages were deducted and the firm
otherwise completely ignored safety. However, even in this case, such an award
would provide overinsurance. Consumers, for example, would not want to
purchase products with such a punitive damages insurance policy attached to it.
In addition to these money-risk tradeoffs in prices and wages, there are other
economic mechanisms that may foster safety. Consumers may boycott the
product. There also may be stock market repercussions that either embody these
reputational effects or reflect additional reassessment by investors of the value
of the firm in the wake of these accidents .64
The courts, at least implicitly, recognize other financial consequences that
affect corporate incentives. The degree of reprehensibility of the corporation's
behavior and the divergence between the corporate action and the appropriate
degree of care are typically among the factors to be considered in the setting of
61. For review of this evidence, see Viscusi, supra note 32.
62. For a comprehensive review, see id. at 59-73.
63. See id. at 52-53, tbl.4-1.
64. For review of the evidence on the stock market repercussions of liability suits, see evidence as
presented in W. Kip Viscusi & Joni Hersch, The Market Response to Product Safety Litigation, 2 J.
REG. ECON. 3, 213-30 (1990).
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punitive damages. However, the assumption that it is only the courts that
provide incentives after an accident establishes an unrealistic reference point.
Some corporations conceivably may set their safety level at zero. But rampant
neglect of safety is uncommon, even in situations in which there is no anticipa-
tion of liability. This phenomenon shows that other societal mechanisms foster
safety incentives. Government regulations check systematic neglect of safety.
There will also be market penalties for unsafe products, as well as reputational
costs.
D. GOVERNMENT REGULATION PROVIDES ADDITIONAL INCENTIVES FOR SAFETY
Airplane crashes generate stock market losses that average $50 million per
life lost.65 Government sanctions may impose costs on firms when there are
regulatory violations. To capture appropriately the incentive structure that should
be designed for punitive damages, it is also essential to take into consideration
the incentives provided through these other institutional actors. Otherwise, firms
will be penalized multiple times by separate social institutions, each of which is
generating incentives to decrease risk.
Companies' incentives for safety come from a variety of sources. For mar-
keted products, consumers respond to a perceived increase in risk by being
willing to pay less for products declared to be hazardous, such as the Audi 2000
brakes or alar in apples. Notably, the Ford Pinto was dropped from Ford's
product line not long after the Ford Pinto litigation.66
In addition to the value of court awards, companies also suffer stock price
diminutions and adverse publicity that may impose costs well beyond the court
awards themselves. A detailed study of the effects of tort liability publicity on
the value of firms indicates that these effects were often substantial, and in
many cases exceeded the actual awards themselves.67 Furthermore, stock price
effects are suffered not only by corporate officers but also by stockholders not
involved in the decision.
In considering the risk-reduction incentives facing companies, it is worth-
while to recognize that there are multiple institutional actors that generate such
incentives. The market and the courts are two such social institutions, but a
variety of government regulations are at work as well. Airplane safety is subject
to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rules, air traffic controllers' actions,
and government inspections. Cigarettes bear congressionally mandated warn-
65. See Ivy E. Broder, The Cost of Accidental Death: A Capital Market Approach, 3 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 1, 51-63 (1990).
66. See Viscusi, supra note 45, at 111-13. More generally, for evidence on the price premium
commanded by safer cars, see Mark K. Dreyfus & W. Kip Viscusi, Rates of Time Preference and
Consumer Valuations ofAutomobile Safety and Fuel Efficiency, 38 J.L. & EcON. 79 (1995).
67. For a series of estimates of the stock price effects for product liability events published in the
Wall Street Journal as well as all of the major events associated with the Agent Orange litigation, see
Viscusi & Hersch, supra note 64, at 213-30. Also see the study of airplane crash stock price effects by
Ivy Broder, supra note 65.
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ings and are subject to stringent advertising restrictions. They also are the focus
of a proposed $368.5 billion legislative package. In the case of prescription
drugs, the FDA not only sets the standards for testing the drugs but also, in
effect, writes the warning language that accompanies all new prescription
drugs. 68 For oil tankers in sensitive inland waterways like Prince William
Sound, regulation by the state and federal government, actions by the Coast
Guard, performance of escort tugboats, and other actions not under corporate
control affect accident prevention as well as reaction after a spill has occurred.
The existence of government regulations that specify standards of corporate
69behavior often can serve as a reference point for efficient corporate actions.
The legislative mandates of regulatory agencies are often quite restrictive.
Typically, they require that firms provide a greater level of safety than would be
efficient from an economic standpoint.7 ° The cost per statistical life saved by
these efforts is often well beyond $5 million. Due to the influence of restrictive
legislative mandates, agencies often set these standards based on risk alone, not
risk-cost tradeoffs. As a consequence, an American Law Institute panel recom-
mended that well-defined government regulatory requirements should afford a
regulatory compliance defense against punitive damages.7'
The courts do not currently rule out punitive damages in cases of regulatory
compliance. In one particularly egregious case, a company was penalized $210
million for a chemical spill that was within EPA standards and took no land out
of agricultural use.72
Although the Supreme Court has not yet recognized a regulatory compliance
defense to punitive damages, it has recognized the importance of government
regulations and the character of corporate behavior. In BMW of North America,
Inc. v. Gore,7 3 the Supreme Court observed:
There is no evidence that BMW acted in bad faith when it sought to
establish the appropriate line between presumptively minor damage and
damage requiring disclosure to purchasers. For this purpose, BMW could
reasonably rely on state disclosure statutes for guidance. In this regard, it is
also significant that there is no evidence that BMW persisted in a course of
conduct after it had been adjudged unlawful on even one occasion, let alone
repeated occasions.... In an absence of a history of non-compliance with
known statutory requirements, there is no basis for assuming that a more
modest sanction would not have been sufficient to motivate full compliance
68. See Richard M. Cooper, Drug Labeling and Products Liability: The Role of the Food and Drug
Administration, 41 FOOD, DRUG, CosMETIc L.J. 233, 236 (1986).
69. See Viscusi, supra note 45, at 124-28; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 2-
70. For examples of such excessive levels of safety, see Viscusi, supra note 43 at 118-24.
71. See 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 2, at 110. For a stronger advocacy of a regulatory
compliance defense against all liability, see W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical
Litigation: An Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 SETON HALL L.
REv. 1437 (1994).
72. See Wilhite v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 93-CI-00158 (Ky. Cir. Ct. June 24, 1996).
73. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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with the disclosure requirement imposed by the Alabama Supreme Court in
this case.74
This recognition of the importance of regulatory compliance is in no way
inconsistent with the Court's ruling in the Medtronic case.75 In that case the
Court ruled that the preemption provisions for medical devices did not preclude
lawsuits against defective products. The product in question had never been
explicitly reviewed by the FDA, but instead was a variant of a similarly
marketed product. Moreover, the nature of the FDA review process for medical
devices is not as rigorous as for prescription drugs.76
The United States Supreme Court made clear the narrow limitations that
should pertain to a regulatory compliance preemption defense: "Moreover
federal requirements must be 'applicable to the device' in question, and, accord-
ing to the regulations, pre-empt state law only if they are 'specific counterpart
regulations' or 'specific' to a 'particular device.' 7 7 A regulatory compliance
defense is certainly desirable but does not go far enough. Punitive damages are
not warranted even in situations of regulatory noncompliance, as there are
regulatory sanctions that can establish financial incentives for care.
The advantages of government regulations go beyond simply establishing
well-defined standards of behavior and safe harbors for corporate action. Regula-
tory agencies often serve an informational role, both for research and for data
gathering. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHSTA) pools
information on the number of motor vehicle deaths, assisting companies in
assessing risks. NHTSA, for example, kept a running tally of the number of
deaths potentially related to gas tank placement. 78 More recently, it has devel-
oped statistics on the lives saved and lives lost due to air bags. A central data
analysis of this type is often instructive because regulatory agencies may be
able to identify trends in comparative riskiness of products or may be able to
pool information regarding similar products to identify risks more precisely
than would be possible using information available to the company alone.
Regulatory activities also can serve a coordinating role. One such role is to
standardize the meaning of hazard warning language, as in the case of the FDA
warning language for prescription drugs marketed by different companies.79
There are additional advantages to regulation as well. The process of formulat-
ing regulations can provide a forum for the reconciliation of competing inter-
ests, such as public access to a product of reasonable cost versus concerns with
74. Id., at 579, 584-85.
75. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (finding that the Medical Device Amendments do
not completely preempt state causes of action).
76. See W. Kip Viscusi, Regulatory Reform and Liability for Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices,
in ADVANCING MEDICAL INNOVATION (Thomas Lenard & Henry Miller eds.) (forthcoming).
77. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 472.
78. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 1030 (1991).
79. See Viscusi, supra note 45, at 150.
1998]
HeinOnline  -- 87 Geo. L.J. 319 1998-1999
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
safety. There can also be a debate over the merits of the technical issues,
bringing to bear a specialized expertise of regulatory officials rather than lay
jurors, who may have less specialized knowledge and may be more prone to
perceptional biases.
The character of the ex post regulatory compliance defense is forward
looking. On a retrospective basis, looking back to the situation before the
accident, the sole emphasis is on compensatory damages. However, after the
accident, companies would be subject both to compensatory damages and
detailed government regulations that would emerge after the accident based on
the information that the accident provided. Compliance with these regulations
would ensure efficient operating behavior for the matters addressed by the
regulation, which is the ultimate objective of punitive damages that are levied
from a deterrence standpoint. A violation of these guidelines would be subject to
regulatory penalties, creating necessary incentives for compliance.
E. DYNAMIC RISK MANAGEMENT PROMOTES SAFETY
Even without tort liability or regulatory sanctions, there are often strong
incentives for companies to change their behavior after a major accident or a
catastrophe. A major impetus for increased precautions is that the accident itself
often conveys substantial information about the presence of the risk. Once the
accident has occurred the company will be aware of the need for greater care,
and regulatory agencies may also establish new guidelines for risk actions by
the firm. Because the risk management process is a dynamic process even
without additional financial incentives provided by the courts, companies will
often have the incentive to alter their behavior once the risk becomes apparent.
An important source of learning is through actual events. Auto companies can
observe the frequency with which GM truck gas tanks catch fire upon side
impact. Pharmaceutical companies receive reports of adverse reactions to drugs
that they can use to assess product risks. Similarly, companies can learn about
risks after major catastrophes, such as a major oil spill or the Challenger
disaster.
The difference across these cases is in terms of the sample size involved and
the relationship of the sample size to the probability. For mass marketed
automobiles and pharmaceutical products, there is usually a very large sample
size. In contrast, major catastrophes tend to involve much smaller probabilities
and often are more idiosyncratic events. Learning that the O-rings of the
Challenger shrank in cold weather can help reduce the risk of catastrophes from
an identical cause in the future, but there have not been enough trials of space
shuttle launches to make it possible to identify all such possible risks of
explosion with precision. Catastrophes consequently may be informative with
respect to the particular risk that caused a single accident, but may not provide
information to make judgments for all causes that might generate similar risks
in the future.
Catastrophes are usually not anticipated because risks of substantial losses
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are usually small. The wide swings in risk estimates that arise because of the
unanticipated character of catastrophes are exemplified in the Challenger disas-
ter experience. Before the Challenger disaster, NASA officials estimated that the
chance of such a disaster was one flight in 100,000.80 After the Challenger
disaster, the agency estimated the risk of such a catastrophic accident as one
flight in seventy-eight. A single adverse event led NASA officials to raise their
probability estimates by a factor of 1000.
Part of the shift no doubt was due to the information conveyed by the event,
indicating the limits of technology. However, an additional consequence of the
catastrophe was to increase the credibility of officials within NASA who had
higher risk assessments. Even before the Challenger disaster, some NASA
engineers 8 1 had estimated the risk of catastrophe as one flight in 100 and one
Air Force study indicated that the risk of a booster failure was one flight in
thirty-five.82
The Challenger episode reflects the difficulties of risk assessment within the
context of large organizations. Different people within the organization have
different perspectives on the risk and weigh this information differently. The
working engineers placed the greatest weight on the likely failure rates of the
booster rockets, whereas more senior NASA officials placed greater weight on
the unblemished record of success that they had experienced to date.83
The Challenger incident epitomizes the difficulties involved in situations of
uncertainty coupled with low probability catastrophic events. There may be
widely disparate estimates of the risk, and this range of estimates may be
particularly great in the case of large organizations that have officials with quite
different perspectives. After a catastrophe occurs, the higher risk assessors may
be vindicated, but even if the catastrophe had not occurred it may still have been
the case that the high risk assessors were correct but there simply had not been
enough launches to experience the catastrophic event. Another possibility is that
the low assessors were correct, and we were simply unlucky.
84
Part of the dynamic risk response is a change both in regulatory standards and
legislative requirements. As the risk of thousands of cancers related to asbestos
became better known, society responded in a variety of ways. The courts levied
damages and firms reorganized under bankruptcy laws. OSHA tightened its
regulations to a cost in excess of $100 million per case of cancer prevented, as
did the EPA. The result was a regulatory response and a wave of overreaction
80. See William J. Broad, High Risk of New Shuttle Disaster Leads NASA to Consider Options, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 9, 1989, at Al, A24.
81. See DIANE VAUGHN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION 274 (1996).
82. See Stuart Diamond, Study of Rockets by Air Force Said Risks Were I in 35, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 11,
1986, at A1, A24. The U.S. Air Force estimate was prepared by the rain safety people at the Air Force's
launch facility used by NASA. These officials had more experience with solid-propellant boosters.
83. See VAUGHN, supra note 81, at 274.
84. A branch of statistics known as Bayesian decision theory provides detailed guidelines for
incorporating such risk information. See, e.g., HowARD RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY
LECTURES ON CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1968).
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that followed a period of inadequate regulation. This experience, while extreme,
is not unique. Adverse events and major accidents generate a substantial amount
of information conveyed by the accident that will lead to diverse governmental
and private responses.
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES CAUSE ECONOMIC HARM
A. PUNITIVE DAMAGES DISCOURAGE BENEFIT-COST TRADEOFFS
If punitive damages are simply ineffective and caused no adverse conse-
quences, they should be eliminated. However, their overall performance may be
even worse than simply failing to foster constructive safety incentives; random
and unpredictable punitive damages may in fact cause concrete economic
harms.
One example of such an adverse consequence is that punitive damage awards
discourage companies from doing the kinds of risk management analyses of
benefits and costs that are in society's interest but may offend jurors' sensitivi-
ties. Ideally, tort liability and the other societal mechanisms for promoting
safety should encourage companies to strike a reasonable balance between risk
and cost. Safety improvements should be pursued only so long as the expected
benefits to society exceed the costs. These benefits are not only financial.
Monetary measures of risk and benefit should also include society's willingness
to pay for the health-risk reductions or the environmental improvements that
will take place because of the increased degree of care by the corporation. Thus,
the benefit-cost tradeoff simply requires that safety efforts be undertaken so
long as they are in society's best interest.
Who should be responsible for making such judgments? Should it be the
company, with its extensive knowledge of the cost characteristics of the product
and the market consequences? As Judge Easterbrook has observed, companies
regularly incorporate such safety concerns in a manner that recognizes the
pertinent tradeoffs. Firms routinely perform cost-effectiveness analyses of their
products. Such studies include recognition of the costs of injury and the costs of
production.85 Judge Easterbrook notes that the jury perspective tends to be
incomplete, as the jury focuses on the effects on the injured person in court, not
on the invisible members of the rest of society who will be affected by the
corporate response to tort liability outcomes. Thus, companies are more likely
to take the societal perspective on costs and benefits, whereas jurors tend to
focus on the case specifics.
Making precise assessments of the costs and benefits of safety actions is often
feasible for large corporations. Ford Motor Company, for example, was able to
explicitly calculate the costs and benefits of eliminating a safety hazard for the
85. See Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210, 215 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., concurring)
(engineers design escalators to "minimize the sum of construction, operation, and injury costs").
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Ford Pinto.86 General Motors similarly analyzed the costs and benefits of
fuel-fed fires. 87 Making such calculations may offend some jurors' sensitivities,
but thinking rigorously about risks and costs is exactly what we would like
companies to do so that they can strike a reasonable balance between risks and
costs. Ford's calculations indicated the costs and risk associated with different
gas tank locations for the Ford Pinto. Although these estimates have been
widely touted by plaintiffs' lawyers as representing calculations undertaken by
Ford with respect to the risk of gas tank explosion upon rear impact, a more
recent assessment suggests that these calculations pertained not to the risks
associated with rear impact, but rather with the risk of explosion of the gas tank
due to vehicle roll-over.88 Moreover, the analytical context appears to have been
a prospective regulatory action, not an effort to escape liability. Regardless of
which particular type of accident to which the calculations pertain, Ford had
extensive quantitative information for such types of explosion risks, which it
could use to assess the risks and the consequences of altering the product
design. Simply making such calculations, however, led to substantial criticism
of Ford's behavior.89
The nature of these calculations was as follows. Relocating the gas tank
would cost Ford $11 per car or truck, which for 12.5 million cars and light
trucks creates a total cost of over $137.5 million. Ford calculated that moving
the gas tank would prevent 180 burn deaths valued at $200,000 per death, 180
serious burn injuries valued at $67,000 per injury, and 2100 burned vehicles
valued at $700 per vehicle. Based on Ford's estimates, the value of the risk
reduction benefits was only $49.6 million-far less than the $137.5 million in
costs. A more appropriate valuation of the risk to life and health using a
deterrence value of life of $5 million, rather than average court awards, leads to
assessed safety benefit values of $1.4 billion, or roughly an order of magnitude
greater than the costs. 90 Whether Ford's decision was in error also depends on
the potential design benefits from the rear gas tank location, which was common
for hatchbacks. Only by making such a calculation can we assess whether the
company made the right tradeoff and, if not, how much it fell short.
Ford clearly erred in such calculations by undervaluing safety. However, the
company should be applauded for its efforts to at least grapple systematically
with the cost and safety implications of its actions. Indeed, in the wake of this
experience, we now know how Ford erred in its value of the safety benefits. In
86. For a detailed presentation of these calculations, see Viscusi, supra note 45, at 111-13.
87. See E.C. Ivey, Value Analysis of Auto Fuel Fed Fire Related Fatalities, GM Memorandum (June
29, 1973) (on file with author).
88. See VAUGHN, supra note 81, at 1013.
89. See BRENr FiSSE & JOHN BRAITHWArrE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS 44
(1983).
90. These calculations are summarized in detail in Viscusi, supra note 45, at 111-13. These
calculations are based on a 1973 internal Ford Company report by E.S. Grush & C.S. Saundby,
Fatalities Associated with Crash-induced Fires and Fuel Leakages, reprinted in FiSSE & BRAITHWAITE,
supra note 89, at 44.
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other cases, the error might be an overassessment of costs or a failure to
adequately assess risks. By making these tradeoffs explicit we can better learn
from our experiences and make more sensible risk tradeoffs in the future. If,
however, courts create a chilling atmosphere for analysis in which explicit
tradeoffs are prevented because of the alleged immorality of considering the
inevitable tradeoff between cost and safety, then we will suppress the type of
systematic thinking about risk that, in the long run, could enhance our safety
much more than clandestine, qualitative decisionmaking.
In the punitive damages award in the Ford Pinto case, there is no evidence
that the courts considered the value of market sanctions. It is likely, however,
that market incentives for safety would be considerable. Gas tank fires and
explosions are visible and highly dramatic events, especially when "re-enacted"
by news organizations. After such accidents, companies will suffer substantial
adverse publicity costs that create powerful incentives to make products safer
even without any court-imposed penalties. Thus, even if Ford erred before the
accident occurred, one would expect the market to generate powerful incentives
for safety once the accidents were publicized.
B. PUNITIVE DAMAGES PROMOTE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SPENDING AND WASTEFUL
PRECAUTIONS THAT MAY LEAD TO INCREASED RISK
A possible defense of punitive damages might be that additional safety
incentives, even if unpredictable, certainly can do no harm and might have
some protective benefit. In this view, our task is presumably to promote safety
at any cost without worrying about benefit-cost concerns. The danger of such an
approach is not simply that it offends economists' quest for policies that pass an
efficiency test in which benefits exceed the costs, but rather that by imposing
punitive damages in an attempt to promote zero risks, we may actually not be
reducing risk levels at all.
The search for zero risk levels is counterproductive. Spending inordinate
amounts of money to achieve the last reductions of risk once risks have reached
a reasonably safe level is more than simply a waste of resources. It diverts these
funds from other productive uses. Such other uses also may have offered safety
benefits and favorable health effects so that diverting resources to wasteful
expenditures involves real health costs.
Judge Williams of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has correctly observed that because of this diversion of resources,
there may be the loss of a statistical life every time the United States govern-
ment spends an inordinate amount on regulatory efforts. He suggested that
expenditures in the vicinity of $10 million per statistical life have no net
beneficial effects because these funds otherwise could have had a greater effect
in reducing risk by paying for better food, medical care, housing, and other
life-extending consumption items.91 Although some statistical estimates suggest
91. See International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Williams, J.,
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that expenditures around $10 million could in fact lead to the loss of a statistical
life, my estimates, which use an approach that avoids the statistical complica-
tions of disentangling the causality involving income and mortality, suggest that
a more appropriate reference point is $50 million.92 What this estimate means is
that every time we spend $50 million or more to eliminate an expected death,
there is the loss of a statistical life because we divert resources from other
worthwhile mortality-reducing purposes.
The nature of this risk-risk effect may seem surprising, but its underlying
economic principle is captured in the following example. Suppose that some
risk prevention is no more safety-enhancing than digging ditches and filling
them back up again. Such efforts do nothing to promote safety, but people may
be injured in the process. Moreover, if we had devoted the ditch digging
resources to a standard bundle of consumer items, including items such as
medical care, some lives could have been saved. Saving that $50 million,
instead of spending it on endeavors that promise little or no return, produces
greater overall health, because the greater affluence that results allows us to
spend more on the types of goods and services that will promote our health.
C. PUNITIVE DAMAGES DISCOURAGE INNOVATION
Punitive damages are the quintessential mechanism for generating a large tort
liability award. In the absence of punitive damages, the court award will be
restricted to the much more modest damage amount. Do such high awards
bolster the incentives for safety or do they have some adverse repercussions?
Most assessments of this question have focused on anecdotal evidence. To
address this issue more systematically, Michael Moore and 193 developed a large
database that included measures of innovation by industry for a large sample of
firms. These innovations included new patents, new product introductions, and
other measures that would provide reliable indicators of the degree to which the
industry was undertaking the kinds of activities that would lead to the economic
progress that has enhanced our lives and well-being. At low and modest levels
of damages, court awards have the constructive effect that supporters of the
liability system have long discussed. In particular, modest levels of damages
foster innovation and product changes that bolster our level of safety. Thus, a
modest award level has a constructive effect in leading firms to undertake the
kinds of product modifications and new product introductions that will reduce
our risks.
Once the damage levels become very high, however, the effect is counterpro-
concurring).
92. See W. Kip Viscusi, Mortality Effects of Regulatory Costs and Policy Evaluation Criteria, 25
RAND J. ECON. 94 (1994). The approach I use is to explicitly link the implicit value of saving a
statistical life with the value that leads to the loss of a statistical life through regulatory expenditures.
For further discussion, see W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U. CHi. L. REv. 1423 (1996).
93. Michael Moore & W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability, Research and Development, and Innova-
tion, 101 J. POL. ECON. 161, 161-84 (1993).
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ductive. High damage levels suppress innovation across the board. Firms in
effect stop innovating because of the substantial penalty that they suffer for new
and uncertain product introductions, as opposed to better established technolo-
gies. Once damages become excessively high, either product development will
stagnate or firms will withdraw from the market altogether. Such withdrawal
has been experienced in the United States private aircraft industry's production
of private planes. 94
A more prominent case in point is the effect of punitive damages on vaccines.
Vaccines are vital to our physical well-being. Unfortunately, some people suffer
side effects from vaccines, which create substantial liability burdens on the
affected firms. The wave of litigation against vaccine producers led to a more
than 50% reduction in the number of manufacturers of vaccines since 1968. 95
Presently, single-product monopolies are the producers of many major vaccines,
including those for polio, mumps, measles, rabies, and rubella. In much the
same way, many pediatric vaccines are now produced only by a single-product
supplier, as other firms have exited the market.96 The substantial increase in
vaccine prices, far above the overall inflation rate, can also be traced to the
rising role of liability costs. 9 7 In the usual economic context, a higher price
means that fewer people will buy the product. The same is true of vaccines-as
the cost of vaccines has increased, the rate of immunization in the United States
has decreased.98
These economic harms are concrete and demonstrable. However, they have
largely been ignored because punitive damages discussion has focused on
punishment of corporations. The discussion should focus instead on what
financial incentive we should provide to corporations to promote safety, recogniz-
ing that we benefit from corporate activity in many ways that are fundamental to
our lives. Unfortunately, litigation, particularly in the case of severe losses that
prompt punitive damages, tends to focus on the narrow context of the individual
case rather than the broader effect on corporate incentives and the economy as a
whole.
The high stakes punitive damages lottery can be influential even when
punitive damages are not awarded. The threat of punitive damages can have a
chilling effect on corporate behavior. A widely publicized recent case involves
the Cabbage Patch doll, which chewed off the hair of a nine-year-old girl. The
94. See Viscusi, supra note 45, at 8.
95. A general discussion of these issues appears in AMA Board of Trustees, Impact of Product
Liability on the Development of New Medical Technology, 137 PROC. House of Delegates 79-91
(1988).
96. This effect is discussed in Vaccine Injury Compensation: Hearing on H.R. 1780, H.R. 4777, and
H.R. 5184 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Env't of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 99th Cong. 115 (1986).
97. See AMA Board of Trustees, supra note 95, at 7. Further discussion appears in Gina Colata,
Litigation Causes Huge Price Increases in Childhood Vaccines, 232 SCIENCE 1339 (1986).
98. This effect is discussed in Sara Rosenbaum, Rationing Without Justice: Children and the
American Health System, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1859, 1867-68 (1992).
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company received substantial adverse publicity and the girl's parents filed suit
asking for a $25 million punitive damages award. 99 In another alleged risk
injury, an audience member at a New York performance of Cats filed a suit
asking for $6 million in punitive and compensatory damages because one of the
cats in the show (Rum Tum Tiger) asked her to dance, sat on her lap, and
mussed up her hair.1° ° Seemingly ridiculous claims for punitive damages can
have chilling economic effects. Even if there are ultimately no jury punitive
damages in such instances, the unpredictability of juries and the threat of
punitive damages due to past punitive damages awards in other seemingly
frivolous cases may lead firms to settle out of court to avoid the risk of a major
financial penalty.
V. WHAT AILS THE SYSTEM?
Why do courts have difficulty making sound judgments regarding risk actions
and associated punitive damages? Is jury error likely to be especially great for
punitive damages as compared to, for example, compensatory damages? Does
the risk assessment context create additional difficulties? Even if juries do not
err more when assessing punitive damages, the larger stakes will make punitive
damages a more pressing concern. However, juries' ability to make sound
judgments on corporate risk actions is likely to be severely limited.
Decisions involving risk and uncertainty are notoriously difficult. People
often make systematic mistakes in such situations because these situations
impose much greater demands on the decisionmaker than choices involving
certainty.'l° These errors in perception and decisions will affect the behavior of
individuals within organizations as well as juries' perspective on accident cases.
Which of the many errors in perception and decision will be pertinent depends
in large part upon the character of the risk decision and the informational
context.
A. OUTCOMES VERSUS PROBABILITIES
An important distinction exists between probabilities and consequences. The
probability is the likelihood that the event will occur; the consequence repre-
sents the magnitude of the loss in an accident situation. A basic difficulty is that
people may confuse the two components. 10 2 High losses, for example, might
erroneously affect perceptions of the preyentability of the accident. The exis-
tence of a substantial loss ex post does not, however, imply that the ex ante
probability that the loss would have occurred was large or that this probability
99. See 25 Prod. Safety Liab. Rep. (BNA) 45-47 (Jan. 17, 1997).
100. See Bruce Weber, Suit Says 'Cats' Character was Much Too Frisky, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 1, 1997,
at A21-22. The cat who inflicted these alleged damages is no longer with the show.
101. For a review of some of these problems, see W. KEP Viscusi, RATIONAL RISK POLICY (1998).
102. In general, jurors have difficulty assessing the magnitude of punitive damages. See Daniel
Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK
& UNCERTAINTY 1, 47-84 (1998).
1998]
HeinOnline  -- 87 Geo. L.J. 327 1998-1999
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
could have been manipulated significantly through preventive actions. Thus, the
correct test of whether the firm took an efficient degree of care is whether the
cost of the precaution was less than the change in the risk probability that would
have resulted from the precaution, multiplied by the size of the accidental
loss.' 0 3 Making such a judgment requires, however, that juries take themselves
back in time, before the accident, and make a risk judgment untainted by
knowledge that the accident has in fact occurred.
B. HINDSIGHT BIAS
10 4
A pitfall for juries operating after the fact is that they may incorrectly assess
the firm's knowledge of the risk. With the benefit of hindsight they may infer
that the company also had full information but simply did not care enoUgh about
safety to invest in a greater level of protection. Firms, however, lack the
clairvoyant powers implicit in the common assumption that they should have
anticipated all possible accidents.
Using the post-accident information as the yardstick for determining how
companies should select their safety levels, a higher level of safety precautions
will seem optimal compared to what one would have chosen based on the more
imperfect information available before the accident occurred. The retrospective
approach in the courtroom, consequently, will overstate the magnitude of the
punitive damages required to align the incentives of the firm with those needed
to produce efficient degrees of care. Hindsight bias of juries consequently leads
to excessive penalties on firms when juries overstate the firm's degree of
knowledge prior to the accident.
Ideally, a jury should assess the corporation's decision based on the degree of
risk information available. Judging corporate behavior based on subsequent
information rather than on that available at the time of the safety action will
lead to an overstatement of the behavior's reprehensibility. Judge Easterbrook
notes that juries are more prone to problems of hindsight bias than corporations,
which are more likely to focus correctly on the prospective effects of actions. As
Judge Easterbrook observes: "The 'ex post' perspective of litigation exerts a
hydraulic force that distorts judgment." 1O5
Putting aside such hindsight biases is inherently difficult for juries. What was
the state of information at the time of the decision, and will the jury use this as
the reference point? After the fact, if an accident has occurred, the retrospective
accident probability will be 1.0. However, the appropriate reference point for
assessing whether the firm has met its obligations is whether it made the
103. For fuller articulation of the risk-utility formulation, see Viscusi, supra note 45. This concept
has its roots in the "Learned Hand Formula." A company is liable if the cost of precaution is less than
the probability of accident multiplied by the size of the loss. See United States v. Carrol Towing Co.,
159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
104. For a fuller analysis, see REID HASTIE ET AL., A STrUDY OF JUROR AND JURY JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL
CASES: HINDSIGHT EFFECTs ON LIABurrY JUDGMENTS (1998).
105. Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210, 215 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
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appropriate ex ante risk tradeoff given the available information and the economi-
cally feasible set of corporate protective actions. These corporate actions in-
clude both changes in technology and operating procedures that could affect
human behavior.
C. IRRATIONAL RESPONSE TO SMALL PROBABILITIES
AND PREMIUMS FOR ZERO RISK
Many potential biases in risk perception stem from the character of the risk.
For low probability events that have been called to their attention, people
usually overestimate the level of the risk.10 6 Small identified risks tend to be
overestimated, while very large risks often are underestimated. To the extent
that accidents and major catastrophes involve small probabilities, there will be a
tendency to overestimate their likelihood once these possibilities are called to
people's attention. Whereas when people are completely unaware of the risk,
they may underestimate the extent of the hazard. 107
The practical consequences of this effect for jury assessments of corporate
risk actions is that people will perceive identified risks as having a higher
probability of an accident than was the case ex ante. Companies consequently
will attempt to avoid these risks more than they would if the risk levels were
properly understood. After the fact, the hazards will be identified. Since juries
operate on an ex post basis, there will be a tendency of juries to over-assess the
likelihood of accidents involving small probabilities, reflecting the observed
systematic pattern of biases regarding the level of the risk. Overcoming this bias
may be difficult for juries to do.
A corollary to this overestimation of small probabilities is that people will be
willing to pay a premium for the certainty of getting to a situation of zero
risk. 0 8 Since people overestimate small probabilities, decreasing the risk from a
small probability to zero will have a greater effect on the perceived risk
reduction than a risk decrease of the same magnitude that did not reach zero.
Studies of consumer valuation of risk reduction, for example, have indicated
that reducing the risk of injury from household chemical products from 5/10,000
to zero has a much greater perceived value to consumers than decreasing the
risk level from 15/10,000 to 5/10,000.'09 The latter risk decrease represents
twice the risk decrease associated with zero risk, but consumers value it less.
Whereas economic predictions would indicate that people should have a dimin-
ishing willingness to pay for successive reductions in risk, in practice consum-
ers place an excessively high value on the last reduction in risk that decreases
106. See BARUCH FISCHHOFF ET AL., ACCEPTABLE RISK (1981).
107. See HOwARD KUNREUTHER ET AL., DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS
(1978).
108. In practice there are few activities that are truly zero risk, though some components may have
negligible risks.
109. See W. Kip Viscusi et al., An Investigation of the Rationality of Consumer Valuations of
Multiple Health Risks, 18 RAND J. ECON. 465 (1987).
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the risk to zero. The appeal of zero risk leads government officials to declare
that our food is "safe" rather than indicating, for example, that only a small
number of Americans will be killed by food poisoning this year.
This perceptional bias may also influence jury behavior. To the extent that
juries also exhibit a certainty premium, they will value elimination of the risk
by a company by more than is warranted given the extent of the risk reduction.
Similarly, departures from zero risk will be viewed as more grievous offenses
than they are. Juries will not appropriately value the company's efforts to reduce
the risk to a small, but nevertheless nonzero amount. This latter relationship
arises because the bias in risk perceptions in terms of overestimating small
probabilities in effect flattens the relationship between actual risks and per-
ceived risks so that the public perceives a smaller reduction in risk than has
actually occurred.11 ° Figure 1 illustrates this relationship for mortality risks.
People overestimate small risks and underestimate large risks. The perceived
probability curve is flatter than the actual probability curve, that is, the 45-
degree line. Juries consequently underestimate the extent of the risk reduction a
company has achieved and overestimate the importance of further risk reduc-
tions to a zero risk level. The underestimation of corporate risk-reduction efforts
leads to jury bias against corporate defendants in cases involving risk and
uncertainty.
D. IRRATIONAL RESPONSE TO NOVEL RISKS
The character of a risk also plays an important role. People tend to overreact
to risks associated with new technologies, risks that represent increases from
accustomed risk levels, risks outside of their personal control, and risks associ-
ated with highly publicized events."'1 People may also confuse probabilities and
outcome amounts, rating the probability as higher if the loss is severe.'
12
What is quite striking is that almost all of these elements will be present in
many punitive damages cases involving accidents or illnesses. Consider, for
example, litigation involving breast implants and asbestos. Breast implants
involve a new technology which presents new risks. The women who received
these implants incurred risks that were then outside of their personal control.
These risks have also generated considerable publicity. Asbestos risks likewise
have been highly publicized, are outside of the control of the exposed indi-
vidual, and involve risks that workers were not fully cognizant of when they
incurred the risk because of evolving scientific knowledge. People tend to
overreact to such risks, producing excessive responses by juries in their role of
assessing liability and punitive damages.
110. See Viscusi, supra note 32.
111. For documentation of these phenomena, see FiscmotF ET AL., supra note 106; Viscusi, supra
note 32; W. Kip Viscusi ET AL., 4 U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT,
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT PROPOSED TRANS-ALASKA PIPELINE 471 (1972).
112. See ANI. GABA & W. Kip Viscusi, INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN SUBJECTIVE RISK THRESHOLDS,
44 MGMT. SCL 801 (1998).
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E. IRRATIONAL RESPONSE TO UNCERTAIN RISKS
A final form of irrationality that is potentially influential is the well-known
Ellsberg paradox.113 People prefer a precisely understood chance of winning a
prize to an equivalent "soft" probability that is uncertain. There is a counterpart
to this effect in the case of losses. Studies of individual attitudes toward
ambiguous risks and environmental damage indicate that people are ambiguity
averse. 114 Precisely understood risks of adverse outcomes are preferred to more
ambiguous uncertainties of an adverse environmental outcome even though the
average probability of an adverse outcome is the same in each instance. For
example, people would rather face a known chance of an adverse consequence
of 2/1000 rather than a 50/50 chance that the risk is either 1/1000 or 3/1000.
This pattern of ambiguity aversion will tend to make companies more
cautious in situations of ambiguity than they might be in situations of known
113. See Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q.J. ECON. 643 (1961).
114. See W. Kip Viscusi et al., Communication of Ambiguous Risk Information, 31 THEORY &
DECISION 159 (1991); see also W. Kip Viscusi & Wesley A. Magat, Bayesian Decisions with Ambiguous
Belief Aversion, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 371 (1992). The latter language is from BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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risk. However, if they are unfortunate enough to experience an adverse out-
come despite their precautions, juries are likely to be particularly unforgiving.
Juries are particularly likely to be excessively demanding in situations of
uncertainty to the extent that they treat the risks incurred by the company as
being greater because they are uncertain. Thus, we are led to a perhaps
paradoxical result. Situations of uncertainty, in which precautionary behavior
will be particularly difficult for companies because of the absence of well-
defined risks, should have more lenient liability standards. The tendency, how-
ever, for people (and thus juries), to overestimate uncertain risks means that
they will treat corporate defendants particularly harshly in situations of uncer-
tain risk.
Again, the basic difficulty that arises with respect to this and other errors in
jury behavior is that jurors are not acting as fully rational risk decisionmakers
before the fact, but rather as critics with quite different information after the
fact. From this external reference point, jurors cannot distinguish between
judgments that are rational regarding precautions, but that may be in error, and
malicious acts. The result may be jury anger with a company's performance that
leads to a punitive sanction.
VI. REFORMING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. THE LIMITATIONS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES CEILINGS
Current punitive damages reform efforts have been largely preoccupied with
the search for an elusive ideal ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
damages. Punitive damages have been the subject of a variety of state-level
punitive damages reforms that have either established punitive damages caps or
set ratios between punitive damages and compensatory awards."- 5 Patricia Born
and I have shown that damages caps have been the most effective liability
reforms." 6 However, punitive damages ceilings and multipliers have a seem-
ingly arbitrary element in that there is no apparent basis for setting such
quantitative guidelines." 7 Moreover, caps may be counterproductive by serving
as an anchor, setting a target for juries to meet. "8
The United States Supreme Court has indicated that the extent of the punitive
damages amount should be related to the compensatory damages level, but has
resisted strict numerical formulas. In upholding the punitive damages award in
115. For a summary of these various reforms, see Alexander Volokh, Punitive Damages and
Environmental Law: Rethinking the Issues, 213 Reason Foundation Policy Study 20 n.91 (1996),
especially Table 6. Similar punitive damages reforms have been considered by Congress, though no
Federal punitive damages reform has been enacted.
116. See Viscusi & Born, supra note 4.
117. For discussion of the merits and disadvantages of ceilings and multipliers, see 2 AMERICAN LAW
INS trruE, supra note 2, at 258-59.
118. See Michael Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 L. & HuM. BEHAv. 243
(1997).
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Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, the Court concluded: "We are
aware that the punitive damages award in this case is more than 4 times the
amount of compensatory damages.... While the monetary comparisons are
wide and, indeed, may be close to the line, the award here did not lack objective
criteria."' 1 9 In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., the Court
upheld an award that was more than 526 times the compensatory damages
amount:
In support of its submission that this award is 'grossly excessive,' TXO
places its primary emphasis on the fact that it is over 526 times as large as the
actual damage awards.... While petitioner stresses the shocking disparity
between the punitive award and the compensatory award, that shock dissi-
pates when one considers the potential loss to respondents, in terms of
reduced or eliminated royalty payments, had petitioner succeeded in its illicit
scheme. 120
In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Court overturned a punitive
damages award that was 1000 times as large as the compensatory damages
amount, but the Court did not overturn the award because it exceeded some
numerical guideline for propriety: "As in Haslip, we are not prepared to draw a
bright line marking the limits of a constitutionally acceptable punitive damages
award." 12 Rather, the problem was that the award did not reflect the reprehensi-
bility of the conduct of BMW or the level of damages needed to provide the
appropriate corporate incentives.
The legal reform advocated here goes beyond any punitive damage formulas
or caps. All such efforts are arbitrary. Their underlying impetus is that punitive
damages are out of control and that we need some means to impose discipline.
Picking a cap of $1 million has no more economic justification than any other
target number, whether $500,000 or $5 million.
If a legal policy instrument is fundamentally flawed, the solution is to
eliminate it rather than to restrict the harm it creates. Rather than set arbitrary
ceilings on punitive damages, an approach that better addresses the net social
costs of punitive damages is to abolish them altogether. Doing so will sacrifice
no significant deterrence and will eliminate all of the punitive damages ills that
have motivated the arbitrary cutoffs on punitive awards.
B. A PROPOSAL TO ABOLISH PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Do punitive damages pass a benefit-cost test? Put somewhat differently, is
there any basis whatsoever for believing that the benefits derived from punitive
damages exceed the wide range of costs generated by punitive awards? The
119. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
120. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 459-64 (1993).
121. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585 (1996).
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benefits side of the ledger indicates no significant gains to society. Compensa-
tory damages do serve an essential role in a wide variety of instances by
compensating victims and providing incentives for deterrence. Abolishing puni-
tive damages would not diminish the current role of compensatory damages;
such awards would still meet the needs of accident victims and create incentives
for deterrence.
The main theoretical exceptions to the adequacy of compensatory damages
for deterrence involve a fairly narrow range of circumstances. Concerns about
punishing malicious behavior are pertinent mostly to individual action, and only
rarely to corporate risk decisions. Similarly, enforcement error is not a salient
problem for corporate actions, which are typically readily identifiable in the
case of the large-scale losses for which punitive damages might be awarded.
Punitive damages for corporate decisions have traditionally played a role in
major catastrophes or other cases of substantial individual loss, and in these
instances the identity of the corporation is usually well known. Moreover,
assessing the enforcement error probability entails intractable statistical judg-
ments likely beyond any jury's competence.
The final instance in which punitive damages might be warranted is for
outcomes such as fatalities in which incentives beyond monetary equivalents
are needed to create adequate deterrence. However, punitive damages in such
instances create inefficiencies. They provide excessive insurance to society, by
awarding accident victims a damages payment much larger than they need and
more than the victims would voluntarily choose if given the option of purchas-
ing an individual insurance policy for such losses. Punitive damages are also
rarely awarded in the case of outcomes such as fatalities because corporations
seldom completely ignore safety concerns even though they may occasionally
fall short of an adequate level of safety. Compensatory damages awards,
regulatory sanctions, and market-based penalties can bolster incentives in this
instance.
The costs of punitive damages are well established. Punitive damages are
highly uncertain and constitute a dangerous lottery for firms engaged in poten-
tially risky lines of corporate activity. As a society, we want to encourage
risk-taking, such as the development of new pharmaceutical products and new
lines of commerce. In the absence of such progress, our standard of living will
fall, with attendant adverse effects on our health. Excessive punitive damages
awards depress innovation and create excessive incentives for safety that may in
fact increase the risks we face.
The widespread dissatisfaction with the role of punitive damages in the
liability system is well established. This dissatisfaction has continued despite
more than a decade of state-level punitive damages reform efforts. These
reforms invariably constrain the level of punitive damages rather than provide
more subtle guidance to juries about when punitive damages are warranted
based upon concerns raised in the law and economics literature. The reason
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why the legislative reforms have been unable to provide such guidance is
that there is simply no well-defined set of circumstances in which a compel-
ling case for punitive damages exists. For this reason, I propose that
punitive damages awards be eliminated for corporate risk and environmental
decisions.
Would such a proposal leave us only with compensatory damages? From a
tort-centric perspective, tort law, of course, is the principal source of incentives
for corporate behavior. However, corporations operate in a much broader
environment than the tort system. Corporations deal in markets, which generate
powerful incentives for safety. The workers who are hired and who bear risks on
the job are hired in a market. Similarly, the products the corporation sells go to
consumers who themselves respond to risk levels. Public reactions and the
adverse repercussions that result after major corporate transgressions will gener-
ate additional losses to the firm that bolster these financial incentives.
Governmental institutions also impose a wide variety of regulatory require-
ments that influence corporations' risk and environmental decisions. These
regulations typically impose more stringent requirements than a person would
select to meet an efficient level of safety. Moreover, agencies can impose
regulatory penalties even when there is no accident, thus making it possible to
create incentives in a broader range of circumstances. Consequently, corpora-
tions operating within a regime of government regulations consequently should
not be exposed to punitive damages. If a company's actions violate a regulation,
then we can rely upon the sanctions imposed by regulatory agencies to foster
the appropriate safety incentives. Because compensatory damages would aug-
ment these regulatory sanctions, as would any market responses, there would be
powerful incentives for safety, even for regulatory violators, without the imposi-
tion of punitive damages.
Even at a hypothetical level, making a case for punitive damages is hard.
With some effort, scholars can construct hypothetical examples of situations
meriting punitive awards such as those involving enforcement error. Even for
narrowly defined hypothetical cases there is no empirical evidence whatsoever
that juries can make reliable judgments on the subtle statistical and economic
issues involved. Moreover, there is a wealth of empirical evidence documenting
the difficulties people have in judging risky actions-biases that typically will
be prejudicial to corporate defendants.
The legal policy choice does not permit us to have omniscient juries apply
tightly circumscribed punitive damages rules generated by highly specialized
economic models. If punitive damages remain a potential form of damages,
there is no reason to believe that juries will perform more satisfactorily in the
future than they have after a decade of punitive damages reform.
Punitive damages taint the integrity of our judicial system. Legal observers
such as Supreme Court Justice O'Connor have recognized the randomness of
1998]
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jury behavior.12 2 Punitive damages generate no statistically significant deterrent
effects, but the unpredictable chance of catastrophic losses can generate substan-
tial harm. If one were to apply the usual tools of policy analysis pertinent to
judging government expenditure programs and regulations, the required policy
test would be simple. Do punitive damages create more good for society than
harm? Punitive damages clearly fail any conceivable test of efficacy. The most
sensible legal reform is to abolish punitive damages for corporate safety and
environmental tort.
APPENDIX: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF DETERRENCE EFFECTS
Tables 1-4 presented comparison of various mean-risk measures for states
with and without punitive damages. These states may, of course, differ in more
dimensions than punitive damages. This section presents more detailed multivar-
iate regression analysis counterparts that control statistically for the effect of
punitive damages given a variety of other variables, such as the industry mix.
For ease of comparison, the regression table numbering in the Appendix follows
that in the text. The results mirror those in the simpler means tests, and in some
respects are even stronger. Punitive damages have no significant effect in
generating deterrence for any of the safety measures considered. Some of the
beneficial deterrent effects in the analysis of the means no doubt is attributable
to other economic influences.
Table 1A focuses on the total number of chemical accidents and the total
number of such accidents involving injury and death. These regressions control
explicitly for the size of the population, the number of manufacturing employ-
ees per capita household income, and the Republican presidential vote. How-
ever, they also include measures of the extent of chemical industry activity,
including the number of employees in the chemical industry, the oil and gas
extraction industry, and oil refining. While a variety of these industry mix
variables are consequential as predictors of chemical accidents, states with no
punitive damages do not perform differently in any significant manner. The
omitted punitive damages variable is for states with no punitive damages
permitted. These states consequently serve as the reference point for assessing
the role of punitive damages in all the subsequent regressions. The main
question to be addressed is whether there is evidence of a deterrent effect in any
of the three punitive damages regime states for which insuring punitive dam-
ages is permitted, states where such insurance is not permitted, and states where
the status of such insurance has yet to be resolved.
The regression analysis in Table 1A for toxic chemical accidents will follow
the same general pattern as all subsequent analyses. I will first estimate a single
model including the three punitive damages variables and a state scale measure
122. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 45-6 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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such as population. The equation will then be expanded to include other
variables of potential influence, such as those reflecting industry mix and
political factors. The results for toxic chemical accidents in Table IA do not
indicate any significant influences for any of the three punitive damages-
insurance regimes.
Table IA
Regression Results for 1988-1992 Toxic Chemical Accidents and Toxic Chemical
Accidents Involving Injury or Death
Variable Toxic Chemical Accidents Toxic Chemical Accidents Involving
Injury or Death
Intercept -239.009 492.084 -16.213 2.268
(303.400) (407.554) (17.228) (23.303)
Population 1.45 x l0 "4 **  2.91 x 10-' 9.75 x l04*** 1.86 x 106
(0.14 x 10") (2.22 x 10-') (0.80 x l0 " ) (1.27 x 10"6)
State has punitives, but 427.263 -30.197 14.916 2.892
ambiguously insurable (359.881) (180.016) (20.435) (10.293)
punitives indicator
State has insurable punitives 301.412 42.918 11.796 2.906
indicator (313.636) (152.688) (17.809) (8.730)
State has uninsurable -51.666 12.525 5.952 14.836
punitives indicator (319.234) (154.400) (18.127) (8.828)
Manufacturing Employees 0.603* 0.076***
(0.336) (0.019)
Per Capita Household -0.015* -0.0003
Income (0.008) (0.0005)
Republican Presidential 3.856 0.312
Vote (1992 %) (5.533) (0.316)
Chemical Employees -2.083 -0.726"**
(SIC 28) (2.715) (0.155)
Oil and Gas Extraction -2.722 -1.305"'
Employees (SIC 13) (3.172) (0.181)
Oil Refining Employees 157.272*** 12.896"**
(SIC 291) (18.723) (1.071)
k2 0.687 0.931 0.771 0.949
Note: standard errors in parentheses. Employment figures are in thousands.
*Significant at 90% confidence level.
**Significant at 95% confidence level.
"'Significant at 99% confidence level.
The toxic release regression results in Table 2A present analyses of the
determinants of facilities reporting toxic discharges, forms reporting toxic
discharges, forms reporting toxic discharges, reduction in surface water dis-
charges, and reduction in total releases. The other variables include measures
from earlier equations as well as toxic facilities per capita. In some cases the
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explanatory power of the regressions is very low. Since the object of the
estimation is to test whether punitive damages matter, not to predict these toxic
releases, the absence of a strong predictive relationship for the some of the toxic
discharge variables is not a major concern. The toxic release regressions also
fail to indicate a deterrent role of punitive damages. For the most part, the three
punitive damages regimes have no significant effect. There are no significant
effects in Panel A. The only exception in Panels A, B, and C of Table 2A is that
with respect to the total percent reduction in surface water discharges there is
one significant effect, which goes in the opposite direction needed for a deter-
rent effect, as it indicates less of a reduction in discharges when there are
punitives, but they are not insurable. However, in the fuller version of the
statistical model there is no such influence. Panel C of Table 2A includes no
statistically significant insurance variable effects. Overall, the punitive damages
regime states do not differ in any significant manner for the Toxic Release
Inventory data.
Table 2A
Regression Results for Toxic Release Inventory
Panel A: Sites Reporting Source Reduction Activities in 1992
Variable Percent of Facilities Reporting Percent of Forms Reporting
Reduction Activities Reduction Activities
Intercept 0.364*** 0.602*** 0.278*** 0.531**
(0.032) (0.114) (0.033) (0.107)
State has punitives, but -0.014 0.025 -0.022 -0.027
ambiguously insurable punitives (0.040) (0.038) (0.041) (0.036)
indicator
State has insurable punitives 0.0028 0.047 -0.031 -0.024
indicator (0.0360) (0.034) (0.037) (0.032)
State has uninsurable punitives 0.0021 0.024 0.005 0.022
indicator (0.0341) (0.031) (0.035) (0.029)
TRI facilities per 100,000 -0.012** -0.014***
population (-0.005) (0.004)
Manufacturing employees per 1.98e" . *  2.38e -' * *
100,000 population (0.82e-') (0.77e-')
Household Income per capita -2.87e' -2.74e(2.08e "' )  (1.96e' )
Republican Presidential Vote -0.0053*** -0.006***
(1992%) (0.0018) (0.002)
k 2 0.009 0.314 0.042 0.435
Note: standard errors in parentheses. Observations weighted by state population.
For sources, see Table 6A, infra.
*Significant at 90% confidence level.
*Significant at 95% confidence level.
***Significant at 99% confidence level.
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Panel B: Changes in Surface Water Discharges Reported in 1992 Toxic Release Inventory
Percent Reduction in Surface Percent Reduction in Surface
Variable Water Discharges from Water Discharges from
1988 to 1992 1990 to 1992
Intercept 38.399 -127.897 27.540 -84.428
(100.480) (415.575) (87.515) (350.535)
State has punitives, but -197.371 -152.063 -204.937* -145.391
ambiguously insurable punitives (125.638) (140.004) (109.426) (118.017)
indicator
State has insurable punitives -13.735 44.804 -12.954 50.666
indicator (111.757) (123.456) (97.982) (104.669)
State has uninsurable punitives -16.762 8.755 -31.050 0.228
indicator (106.050) (113.921) (92.366) (95.976)
TRI facilities per 100,000 
-3.138 -3.660
population (16.793) (14.156)
Manufacturing employees per 0.014 0.019
100,000 population (0.030) (0.025)
Household Income per capita 0.007 0.0057
(0.008) (0.0064)
Republican Presidential Vote -4.291 -5.718
(1992%) (6.637) (5.593)
2 0.043 0.014 0.076 0.092
Note: standard errors in parentheses. Observations weighted by state population.
For sources, see Table 6A, infra.
*Significant at 90% confidence level.
**Significant at 95% confidence level.
***Significant at 99% confidence level.
Table 3A presents a series of two sets of regressions for which the dependent
variables are the per capita fatality rates from medical misadventures and all
accidents. In each case, the first regression reported includes only an intercept
and a set of indicator or dummy variables for whether the state permits punitive
damages and their insurability status. The second set of regression also includes
the per capita manufacturing employees to control for industry mix, the per
capita household income to control for wealth effects, and the percent Republi-
can presidential vote in 1992 to control for political influences. The medical
misadventures equation also includes the number of physicians per capita.
In none of the equations in Table 3A is there evidence that punitive damages
reduce risk. The only statistically significant influence is that the total accidental
death rate is higher in the states with insurable punitive damages, which is the
opposite of a deterrence relationship.
Table 4A presents analogous regression results for the per capita value of
different insurance premiums, which are the counterpart of the mean estimates
in Table 2. As before, the four measures are the per capita values of total
insurance premiums, medical malpractice premiums, product, and other liability
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Panel C: Changes in Total Toxic Releases Reported in 1992 Toxic Release Inventory
Variable
Intercept
State has punitives, but
ambiguously insurable punitives
indicator
State has insurable punitives
indicator
State has uninsurable punitives
indicator
TRI facilities per 100,000
population
Manufacturing employees per
100,000 population
Household Income per capita
Republican Presidential Vote
(1992%)
Percent Reduction in Total
Toxic Releases from
1988 to 1992
31.207"** 6.568
(8.304) (31.959)
Percent Reduction in Total
Toxic Releases from
1990 to 1992
25.222*** 40.997
(7.035) (27.138)
10.171 5.762 -12.522 -7.808
(10.384) (10.767) (8.797) (9.143)
-4.109
(9.236)
9.449
(8.765)
-2.050 -10.937 -3.028
(9.494) (7.831) (8.062)
7.506 -1.068 1.843
(8.761) (7.425) (7.439)
0.752
(1.291)
-0.0025
(0.0023)
0.0012*
(0.0006)
-0.122
(0.510)
-1.481(1.097)
0.0022
(0.0019)
2.13e "4
(4.97e')
-0.764*
(0.433)
k2 0.101 0.167 0.097 0.175
Note: standard errors in parentheses. Observations weighted by state population.
For sources, see Table 6A, infra.
*Significant at 90% confidence level.
**Significant at 95% confidence level.
***Significant at 99% confidence level.
premiums. The explanatory variables parallel those included in Table 3A. All
three of the punitive damages variables in Table 4A are statistically significant.
To the extent that punitive damages have a deterrent role, the risk levels and the
premium amounts should be lower in the punitive damages states. The compet-
ing effect is that the prospect of punitive damages may boost premium levels for
any given level of risk. However, it is not states with insurable punitive
damages that have higher premium rates but the other two punitive damages
state groupings.
For reference, Table 5A summarizes the means and standard deviation of the
variables used, and Table 6A provides the data sources.
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Table 3A
Regression Results for Accidental Death Rates Per Capita
Variable Medical Misadventures All Accidental Deaths
Intercept 0.952*** -0.447 30.836*** 52.919***
(0.219) (0.908) (3.335) (9.607)
State has punitives, but -0.367 -0.396 0.821 -1.595
ambiguously insurable (0.274) (0.279) (4.170) (3.250)
punitives indicator
State has insurable punitives 0.352 0.201
indicator (0.244) (0.251)
State has uninsurable punitives 0.045 -0.048
indicator (0.231) (0.234)
Manufacturing Employees per 2.92 x 10"
100,000 population (2.60 x 10"')
Household Income per capita -1.34 x 10"'(1.59 x 10.')
Republican Presidential Vote
(1992 %)
Physicians per capita
k 2 0.184
Note: standard errors in parentheses.
For sources, see Table 6A, infra.
*Significant at 90% confidence level.
"Significant at 95% confidence level.
-Significant at 99% confidence level.
11.027** 6.185**
(3.709) (2.885)
0.271 -1.228
(3.520) (2.666)
-4.79 x 10'
(3.04 x 10- )
-8.40 x 10" **
(1.76 x 10")
0.029*
(0.015)
0.0029**
(0.0013)
0.231
0.298*
(0.149)
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Table 4A
Insurance Premium Regression Results
Panel A: Total Insurance and Medical Malpractice Insurance Premiums
Variable
Intercept
State has punitives, but
ambiguously insurable
punitives indicator
State has insurable punitives
indicator
State has uninsurable punitives
indicator
Manufacturing Employees per
100,000 population
Household Income per capita
Republican Presidential Vote
(1992 %)
Physicians per 100,000
population
Total Insurance Premiums
983.739*** 345.809
(81.761) (272.208)
45.089 1.719
(101.765) (83.369)
-64.696
(90.825)
52.910
(86.323)
-26.772
(75.165)
2.484
(70.190)
-0.011
(0.008)
0.012**
(0.005)
1.408
(4.478)
1.200**
(0.396)
Medical Malpractice Premiums
18.856*** -9.403
(5.800) (18.403)
0.196 -6.242
(7.219) (5.636)
1.033
(6.443)
6.666
(6.124)
-2.586
(5.082)
-0.970
(4.745)
-0.0011"*
(0.0005)
-3.15xl0
(3.23xl0 )
0.478
(0.303)
0.149***
(0.027)
k2 0.
Note: standard errors in parentheses.
*Significant at 90% confidence level.
**Significant at 95% confidence level.
-Significant at 99% confidence level.
060 0.429 0.024 0.461
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Panel B: Product Liability and Other Liability Premiums
Variable Product Liability Premiums Other Liability Premiums
Intercept 7.654*** 0.588 76.514*** 77.122*
(1.156) (3.180) (12.519) (41.161)
State has punitives, but ambiguously 0.792 2.517** 9.396 14.078
insurable punitives indicator (1.439) (1.068) (15.582) (13.831)
State has insurable punitives -0.871 0.657 -9.487 5.526
indicator (1.284) (0.951) (13.907) (12.315)
State has uninsurable punitives 1.284 2.161 ** 15.036 17.342
indicator (1.221) (0.880) (13.217) (11.390)
Manufacturing Employees per 4.93 x 10'" * *  7.43 x l0-'
100,000 population (1.00 x 10') (129.24 x 10"')
Household Income per capita 1.98 x 10"*** 0.0019*
(0.58 x 10) (0.0008)
Republican Presidential -0.105** -1.794"**
Vote (1992 %) (0.050) (0.641)
k2 0.127 0.558 0.144 0.380
Note: standard errors in parentheses.
*Significant at 90% confidence level.
"Significant at 95% confidence level.
*"Significant at 99% confidence level.
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Table 5A Summary of Variables Means (Std. Deviations)
[Vol. 87:285
[Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Employees in Manufacturing Sector, 1992 (1,000s) 358.078400 383.595900
Employees in the Oil and Gas Extraction Industry (SIC 13), 1996 (1,000s) 5.464706 21.851420
Employees in [lte Oil Refining Industry (SIC 291), 1996 (1,000s) 1.109804 4.374529
Employess in the Chemicals and Allied Products Industry (SIC 28), 1996 (1,000s) 19.664710 24.921650
Indicator which equals I for states without punitive damages 0.078431 0.271524
Indicator which equals I for states with insurable punitive damages 0.470588 0.504101
Indicator which equals I for states with uninsurable punitive damages 0.352941 0.482640
Indicator which equals I for states with uncertain insurance of punitives 0.117647 0.325396
Medical Malpractice Premiums, per capita (1995) 21.494960 11.611970
Medical Misadventures Deaths Per 100,000 Population, 1994 1.103261 0.519397
Motor Vehicle Accident Deaths Per 100,000 Population, 1994 17.868230 5.744419
Other Liability Premiums, per capita (1995) 83.748800 35.775910
Per Capita Employees in Manufacturing Sector. 1992 0.065000 0.026700
Per Capita I tousehold Income, 1994 32,440.040000 4,851.375000
Proportion ofTRl Facilities Reporting Reduction Activities 0.366000 0.090010
Proportion of TRI Forms Reporting Reduction Activities 0.259706 0.069365
Percent Reduction in Surface Water Discharges from 1988 to 1992 (65.743860) 454.705200
Percent Reduction in Surface Water Discharges from 1990 to 1992 (43.913040) 380.355500
Percent Reduction in Total Toxic Releases from 1988 to 1992 33.526780 25.755110
Percent Reduction in Total Toxic Releases from 1990 to 1992 16.880070 17,135410
Physicians Per 100,000 Population, 1994 219.568600 79.608360
Population, 1995 5.154,699.000000 5,741,453.000000
Product Liability Premiums, per capita(1995) 7.800801 2.622146
Ratio of TRI facilities to 1995 population in thousands 0.090300 0.042000
Republican vote in 1992 Presidential Election 37.668630 6.419486
Total Accidental Deaths Per 100,000 Population, 1994 38.127320 8.818885
Total Insurance Premiums, percapita(1995) 1,005.691000 199.321900
Toxic Chemical Accidents Involving Injury or Death, 1988-1992 41.941180 60.336200
Toxic Chemical Accidents, 1988-1992 664.705900 908.791800
HeinOnline  -- 87 Geo. L.J. 344 1998-1999
SOCIAL COSTS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Table 6A
Data Sources for Statistical Analysis
Data Source
Total accident deaths and medical misadventures NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS
deaths (per 100,000 population) 26-27 (1997).
Employees in the chemicals and allied products State and Area Employment, Hours and
industry (SIC 28), employees in the oil and gas Earnings, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1997
extraction industry (SIC 13), and employees in (on-line searchable series catalog,
the oil refining industry (SIC 291) for 1996. http://146.142.4.24/cgi-bin/dsrv?sa).
Employees in Manufacturing Sector during 1992. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1996, at
740 tbl. 1213 (116th ed. 1996).
Manufactures Summary for 1992. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1996, at
740 tbl. 1213 (116th ed. 1996).
Per Capita Household Income for 1994. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1996, at
465 tbl. 716 (116th ed. 1996).
Money Income of Households (median income, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
by state, in constant 1994 dollars: 1984 to 1994). ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1996, at
465 tbl. 716 (116th ed. 1996).
Physicians per 100,000 population for 1994. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTPR ACr OF THE UNITED STATES: 1996, at
124 tbl. 181 (116th ed. 1996).
Active nonfederal physicians and nurses, by state, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
for 1994. ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1996, at
124 tbl. 181 (116th ed. 1996).
1995 population U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1996, at 28
tbl. 27 (116th ed. 1996).
Resident population, states, for 1970-1995. U.S. BUREAU OF mE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1996, at 28
tbl. 27 (116th ed. 1996).
Republican vote in 1992 presidential election. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1996, at
271 tl. 435 (116th ed. 1996).
Popular vote cast for president, by political party, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
states, for 1988 and 1992. ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1996, at
271 tbl. 435 (116th ed. 1996).
Surface water discharges and total toxic releases U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
in 1988, 1990, 1992. OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION AND ToxIcs,
1992 Toxics RELEASE INVENTORY (TRI) PUBLIC
DATA RELEASE 196-204 tbl. 3-12.A (1994).
Toxic chemical accidents and toxic chemical JOEL A. TICKNER & HILLEL GRAY, ACCIDENTS
accidents involving injury or death for the period Do HAPPEN: ToxiC CHEMICAL ACCIDENT
1988-1992. PATTERNS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1994).
Toxic release inventory (TRI) Facilities, TRI ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY OFFICE
forms filed, TRI facilities and forms reporting OF POLLUTION PREVENTION AND ToxICs, 1992
source reduction activities by state. TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY (TRI) PUBLIC
DATA RELEASE 136-37 tbl. 2-13 (1994).
Insurance premium data. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, THE FACT
BOOK 1997: PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE
FACTS 34-35 (1996).
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